The Electrum
Those who are beginning to study the debate between Calvinism and Arminianism tend to entertain two related but mistaken assumptions. The first is that the debate involves only two primary positions. The second is that the more extremely one implements either position, the more distant one must be from the other position. The first of these assumptions is simply untrue. The second is true, but only to a point.
Like visible light, positions in the debate between Calvinism and Arminianism form a continuous spectrum. Every Christian who has an opinion on the issues can be located somewhere along that spectrum. The issues that define the positions, however, are not necessarily those that one might expect.
Participants in this debate will be found arguing about divine sovereignty versus human freedom, about the ordo salutis, about the extent of human depravity, about the role of prevenient grace, and about whether election is unconditional, conditional, or corporate. To be sure, all of these questions are important, but they eventually lead to one critical problem. That problem is the definition of divine foreknowledge.
Divine foreknowledge is the hinge upon which all the other debates turn. One’s definition of foreknowledge will determine whether one ends on the Arminian or Calvinistic side of the debate—and everyone who expresses an opinion is on one side or the other.
Arminians see God’s foreknowledge as His foresight. God looks ahead through the corridors of time and sees what free people will choose. For Arminians, divine foreknowledge is essentially reactive.
For their part, Calvinists see God’s foreknowledge as causative. God’s foreknowledge does not passively observe the future, but rather shapes it. God’s foreknowledge makes things happen. According to Calvinists, foreknowledge is not so much God’s foresight as it is His forethought.
Once a definition has been chosen, the other pieces of the puzzle fall into place almost unavoidably. If God’s foreknowledge is causative, then election must be unconditional. If election is unconditional, then divine calling has to be efficacious. That being so, prevenient grace cannot have reversed the volitional effects of depravity. In other words, most of the Calvinistic system follows with logical certainty from a particular definition of foreknowledge. The exception is the negative side of particular redemption—i.e., the denial that Christ provided redemption for the non-elect.
By the same token, most of the system of Arminianism necessarily flows from viewing God’s foreknowledge as foresight. The exception here is the denial of eternal security. Just as some Calvinists affirm a universal provision of redemption, some Arminians affirm eternal security.
This observation implies that shades and gradations exist on both sides of the dividing line. Strict Calvinists affirm limited atonement, while moderate Calvinists do not. Strict Arminians deny eternal security, while moderate Arminians affirm it.
In other words, the debate involves not two, but at least four positions. These are strict Arminianism, moderate Arminianism, moderate Calvinism, and strict Calvinism. Beyond these four, other positions stretch out both sides of the spectrum.
Much ink has been spilled over the phenomenon of hyper-Calvinism. Unfortunately, this term is generally used as a bare pejorative. The abuse of the term, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that a genuinely hyper-Calvinistic position does exist, though its adherents sometimes prefer to call it “High Calvinism.”
What are the characteristics of a hyper-Calvinist? Four particularly bear mentioning. These include the denial of common grace, the adoption of a supralapsarian order of the decrees, the acceptance of a doctrine of reprobation or double-predestination, and a refusal to make a free offer of the gospel. More extreme versions of hyper-Calvinism might also teach the doctrine of eternal justification or a form of antinomianism. To the extent that a person holds these four beliefs, that person is going beyond traditional Calvinism as defined at Dort, and that is what makes the position hyper-Calvinistic.
A corresponding position exists on the Arminian side of the spectrum. This position does not really have a label, but for sake of designation it could be called hyper-Arminianism. How does this position differ from historic Arminianism?
Traditionally, Arminianism and Calvinism take similar views of depraved human nature. This similarity is evident in Article Three of the original Arminian Articles, which affirms,
That man has not saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as he, in the state of apostasy and sin, can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good (such as saving Faith eminently is); but that it is needful that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, or will, and all his powers, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the Word of Christ, John 15:5, “Without me ye can do nothing.”
Theological students who encounter this statement for the first time often mistake it for a Calvinistic affirmation. It is not. For both traditional Calvinists and traditional Arminians, the will has been so affected by the fall that humans, left to themselves, are utterly incapable of any positive response toward God (in other words, they have lost the moral ability to believe). The difference between Calvinists and Arminians consists in how they solve this problem. According to Arminians, God restores some element of moral ability to all humans as an aspect of prevenient grace. Calvinists believe that God restores full moral ability, but only to the elect as part of saving grace.
This original disabling of the will is what hyper-Arminians deny. In their mind, every human being already has complete freedom of will in every sense, and is always and fully able to choose God at any time. Effectively, hyper-Arminianism denies that depravity has affected the human will. (This position is sometimes mistaken for Pelagianism, but Pelagian theology also denies the imputation of original sin.)
In today’s debates, hyper-Arminians often prefer to call themselves Biblicists. They usually insist that they are neither Calvinists nor Arminians. In one sense, they are right: their position is much more extreme than historic, traditional Arminianism. Nevertheless, their definition of foreknowledge places them firmly on the Arminian side of the spectrum.
So does their insistence upon a libertarian definition of freedom. By this definition, the will is not free unless one might actually make the contrary choice. For Calvinists, however, freedom consists in the ability to do what one chooses without constraint or restraint. Most Calvinists have believed that the will can be shaped and even determined in a number of ways without damaging genuine freedom. The debate between libertarianism and compatibilism corresponds closely to the divide between Arminianism and Calvinism.
This debate also propels some Arminians into an even more extreme position. They reason that if God knows our choices in advance, then we necessarily will make the choices that He foresees. If we will necessarily make a particular choice, however, then it is not really possible to make the contrary choice. In other words, even with a “soft” definition of divine foreknowledge as foresight, libertarian freedom becomes impossible.
The logic of this position is really air-tight, and it results in a pretty abysmal choice. One can affirm foreknowledge and remain biblical, but sacrifice reason. Or one can deny foreknowledge and remain logical, but be forced to reinterpret Scripture in radical ways. Those who deny foreknowledge are known as Free Will Theists or Open Theists. For the most part, Open Theists insist that their theology is simply the logical extension of the core ideas of Arminianism.
Opposite to Open Theism is a position that denies any form of human freedom and subjects every event and decision to “hard” determinism. In extreme versions of hyper-Calvinism, this position makes God so much the author of sin that humans bear little or no actual responsibility for their acts. All Arminians and most Calvinists are horrified by these ideas, just as all Calvinists and most Arminians are horrified by Open Theism.
At this point in the spectrum, an odd thing happens. On one end of the spectrum, hard determinism turns into fatalism (choice is merely an illusion, but people are really ruled by fate). On the other end of the spectrum, freedom becomes so loose as to become virtually random, and therefore essentially a matter of chance, luck, or fortune. But fate and luck are simply different names for the same thing. In other words, the two ends of the spectrum meet. Someone who goes far enough in either direction will end up in exactly the same place.
In the present essay, I am not trying to argue for one direction or the other. Nevertheless, I would like to draw out certain lessons. First, understood in these terms, all Christians who express an opinion end up in some version of Calvinism or Arminianism. Second, more than two positions are possible. Both Arminianism and Calvinism have moderate and extreme versions. Third, it is not proper to critique any position by pointing to its extreme expressions, for the most extreme expressions of both directions are identical to each other. Fourth, there is no one distinctively “Biblicist” position. People from extreme hyper-Calvinists to hyper-Arminians (and perhaps many Open Theists) believe that they are deriving their conclusions from the text of Scripture—and invariably the advocates of one view think that the advocates of all the others are overly influenced by extra-biblical considerations.
Nevertheless, some positions are more biblical than others, and that leads to a final observation. The issues that come into play in the “electrum” are of different kinds. Some of them are serious enough to affect fundamentals of the faith. Any position that makes God the efficient cause of sin is blasphemous. Likewise, any theory that denies exhaustively definite foreknowledge constitutes an implicit denial of the gospel. Furthermore, any theory that makes ultimate salvation dependent upon human work or merit damages the very foundations of the faith.
Having said that, Christians of good will should not impute these extreme theories to the more moderate expressions of Calvinism or Arminianism. To say that every Arminian is an Open Theist or a Pelagian is slander. To suggest that Calvinists necessarily make God the author of sin—as if God Himself induced people to do evil—is to engage in distortion to the point of deception. Each position needs to be understood in its own terms and represented fairly.
Other points of argument, however, are of lesser significance. The definition of foreknowledge is important, but it is an issue over which Christians may charitably disagree. The same is the case with the position of faith and regeneration in the ordo salutis, the definition of election, and the role of common grace in restoring the moral ability to choose God. To be sure, these questions matter a great deal, but they are not the sort of questions over which Christian fellowship and cooperation must fracture. We should be able to discuss such things without raising tempers and voices.
Those discussions would be more fruitful if they began with a spirit of curiosity. A Calvinist ought to wonder how an Arminian can hold the system of faith together with putative integrity and consistency, and the Arminian ought to wonder the same thing about the Calvinist. Therefore, the first step in the discussion should not be to look for evidence that the other is wrong, but to discover those parts of the system that make it seem right. Even if we want to refute another position, the first step toward being able to do that is to learn to articulate it in a convincing way. If each of us would extend this courtesy to the other positions in the “electrum,” we might often change the character of the debate.
All Mortal Vanities, Begone
Isaac Watts (1674–1748)
All mortal vanities, begone,
Nor tempt my eyes, nor tire my ears;
Behold, amidst th’eternal throne,
A vision of the Lamb appears.
Glory His fleecy robe adorns,
Marked with the bloody death He bore;
Seven are His eyes, and seven His horns,
To speak His wisdom and His power.
Lo! He receives a sealèd book
From Him that sits upon the throne;
Jesus, my Lord, prevails to look
On dark decrees and things unknown.
All the assembling saints around
Fall worshipping before the Lamb,
And in new songs of gospel sound
Address their honors to His Name.
The joy, the shout, the harmony,
Flies o’er the everlasting hills
“Worthy art Thou alone,” they cry,
“To read the book, to loose the seals.”
Our voices join the heav’nly strain,
And with transporting pleasure sing,
“Worthy the Lamb that once was slain,
To be our Teacher and our King!”
His words of prophecy reveal
Eternal counsels, deep designs;
His grace and vengeance shall fulfill
The peaceful and the dreadful lines.
Thou hast redeemed our souls from hell
With Thine invaluable blood;
And wretches that did once rebel
Are now made favorites of their God.
Worthy forever is the Lord,
That died for treasons not His own,
By every tongue to be adored,
And dwell upon His Father’s throne!
Kevin T. Bauder Bio
This essay is by Dr. Kevin T. Bauder, who serves as Research Professor of Systematic Theology at Central Baptist Theological Seminary (Plymouth, MN). Not every professor, student, or alumnus of Central Seminary necessarily agrees with every opinion that it expresses.
- 86 views
It is useful for comparing generalized positions, not for finding which specific dot on the line you are and having that dot define your entire theology.
Forrest Berry
[Chip wrote] I don’t know how else to understand 1 John 2:2 than that Christ made a potential atonement for all, which is only made actual based on the sinner exerting faith in that atonement. If the sinner fulfills this one condition (i.e., faith) he/she is saved.Hey Chip, here’s some thoughts to help you with 1 John 2:2.
If you are able, look it 1 John 2:2 in the Greek, and notice the preposition John uses in that verse - the one we translate “for” in English. It is not the preposition used for substitutionary atonement in John’s writings (John 10:11, 15, 11:50, 13:37-38, 1 John 3:16). Instead, in 1 John 2:2 John uses the proposition often translated, “concerning” (see 1 John 1:1). Many assume in 1 John 2:2 that John is writing about the extent of Christ’s substitutionary atonement. He was not. He wrote on the efficacy of Christ’s atonement, not its extent. Christ’s atonement completely propitiates every kind of sin that is in the world of sinning humanity and which a believer might commit.
2nd, many also assume the phrase “the whole world” means each and every person. It does not. See 1 John 5:19, where it does not include all people (it does not include Christians in that verse). In fact, the word “world” never means “each and every person” in the world in the NT. For that we have the Greek word, “oikoumene” (Mat. 24;14, Luke 2:1, Rev. 3:10, 12:9). See Vine’s Expository Dictionary of OT and NT Words, 4:233, Mounce’s Expository Dictionary of OT and NT Words, 808.
3rd, you probably need to answer the question, “If Jesus propitiated the sins of the every person, why does anyone go to hell?” Because if you want to say they go to hell because they did not believe, is that not evidence of the sin of unbelief? And if we say people go to hell for the sin of unbelief, then we also deny Jesus propitiated the Father for that one sin. Yet 1 John 2:2 teaches He propitiated every sin that is in the world. So, did Jesus die for all sins except the sin of unbelief?
4th, the moderate Calvinist believes that 1 John 2:2 teaches a universal propitiation, but does not believe everybody is saved by that propitiation. This requires a redefinition from the biblical meaning of “propitiation” to a definition that means less than “wrath appeasing sacrifice.” IOW, the moderate Calvinist does not believe the work of Jesus on the cross fully bore the wrath of God against the unsaved as their propitiatory sacrifice. Even though Jesus tasted death in their place, yet for the moderate Calvinist He didn’t propitiate the Father for them by His death. Thus the moderate Calvinist position rejects the biblical definition of propitiation in order to maintain a universal atonement. As a result, the Father is still angry with those who His Son propitiated since He still bears His wrath against them. Instead, the moderate Calvinist believes the sinner’s faith removes the Father’s wrath, and I would add, is the real propitiation. The Father is angry until the sinner exerts faith. But Romans 3:25.
5th, if 1 John 2:2 teaches that Jesus died a universal atoning death for the millions of people who died before His incarnation, what did His death on their behalf do for those already in hell? Along the same lines, what good did His propitiation do for Judas?
[RPittman]I think Roland has a real point here. I would amplify that a true spectrum represents quantitative difference regarding one variable factor. The wavelength is a great example, because the only variable is the frequency, a purely numeric factor. You can turn a single knob and watch the light change color. Notice, though, that there isn’t really a factor being quantitatively “tuned” in the suggested electrum. If it were, Calvinism would be 90% active foreknowledge, whereas hyper-Calvinism would be 100% active foreknowledge, and moderate Arminianism would be, I don’t know, 35% active foreknowledge.
First, what is a spectrum? A spectrum is a continuum of phenomena that is arranged in some order of a particular property. The electromagnetic spectrum, which visible light and radio waves are part, is arranged in order of either increasing or decreasing wavelengths or its related property, frequencies. Thus, the spectrum concept might be a useful means of comparing a single aspect of one doctrine, such as paedobaptism, but it is totally unsuited for comparing the multi-multifaceted aspects of broad general categories such as Arminianism-Calvinism. There is no linear relationship here, not even a three-dimensional one. Even if we could devise a complex multidimensional model, it would be so folded and intervoluted that one couldn’t make sense of it due to the complexity.
To argue for the spectral model, one would need to make a factor analysis, I think. I suppose it could be done but I’ve never seen a factor analysis of Calvinism or Arminianism showing the clustering of various doctrines. When college sophomores ask if I’m Calvinist or Arminian, I reply, “Neither.” My beliefs are too eclectic to be labeled or classified by a traditional theological system. Even IFB, and I claim this designation, is not an adequate description. Why? There are IFB’s with whom I differ on doctrinal points.
But, the issue isn’t quantitative. It’s relational. Both classical Calvinists and classical Arminians believe 100% in both divine sovereignty and human free will. The difference is how those two concepts are related. Also, as Bauder admits, the extent of the atonement and “eternal security” aren’t necessarily derived from foreknowledge, so they can’t fit on the spectrum. In other words, you can’t dial back foreknowledge to move from 5-point to 4-point Calvinism.
A second qualification would be that the Calvinist-Arminian debate can’t be the whole series of theological options. Arminianism itself was a modification of Reformed theology, and makes sense only within a broadly Reformed theological structure. It’s ludicrously anachronistic to call Lutherans or Anabaptists or Catholics “Arminians.” They all had theological positions in place before Arminianism ever existed.
On the other hand, if someone acknowledges the limitations inherent in the analogy, I don’t mind a taxonomy along these lines. Obviously, hyper-Calvinism is more similar to Calvinism than it is to Arminianism. So, I think a visual graph can be made that looks similar to the one Aaron made. I wouldn’t necessarily call it a spectrum, though. I think the best layout of positions is found in Warfield’s The Plan of Salvation. You can see a chart on page 10 of http://www.prayermeetings.org/files/Warfield_B_B/The_Plan_of_Salvation_…] this PDF .
My Blog: http://dearreaderblog.com
Cor meum tibi offero Domine prompte et sincere. ~ John Calvin
It is the Arminian doctrine of Prevenient Grace that is absent from Scripture. Where in the Bible are we told that God enables every spritiually dead sinner to understand the Gospel and believe? I haven’t found it after many, many years of searching. It appears to depend upon faulty logic. Since God commanded men to repent and believe, He MUST have reversed some of the results of Adam’s fall, and given all men the ability to understand and respond to the Gospel? Really? Where does the Bible teach that? I find it teaches the opposite repeatedly, namely that the natural man has no ability to either understand nor receive the things of the Spirit. (II Cor. 2:14)
G. N. Barkman
[RPittman] Then, do the factors cluster? Are you sure? How do you know? How do you decide which points are moderate or extreme Calvinism? What about where the same point, such as total depravity, is believed across much of the spectrum? Suppose one describes himself as a moderate 3-point Calvinist. Are his 3-points the same as another moderate 3-point Calvinist?First, I must admit that your points are actually dealing with the substance of Dr. Bauder’s argument.
In the present essay, I am not trying to argue for one direction or the other. Nevertheless, I would like to draw out certain lessons. First, understood in these terms, all Christians who express an opinion end up in some version of Calvinism or Arminianism. Second, more than two positions are possible. Both Arminianism and Calvinism have moderate and extreme versions. Third, it is not proper to critique any position by pointing to its extreme expressions, for the most extreme expressions of both directions are identical to each other. Fourth, there is no one distinctively “Biblicist” position. People from extreme hyper-Calvinists to hyper-Arminians (and perhaps many Open Theists) believe that they are deriving their conclusions from the text of Scripture—and invariably the advocates of one view think that the advocates of all the others are overly influenced by extra-biblical considerations.And I think your point that we need to consider each person’s argument uniquely is the same as Dr. Bauder’s point.
The difference is Dr. Bauder would put them on a spectrum and you would have us consider them independent of each other because they are just too unique to categorize.
In my opinion you carry Dr. Bauder’s point of individuality too far. I too would agree that we need to deal with each person’s particular divergent beliefs. However, categorizations are useful. The spectrum is useful as a general sign post to where a person is. This identification is very useful on a multitude of levels. Labels while often contributing unwanted baggage are still incredibly useful things.
Forrest Berry
[CalebS] Personally, I see one’s understanding of the will to be more determinative of his system than foreknowledge: because of the following paradigm of thought.This is a very interesting possibility and I’ll be chewing on it.
Indeterminism: Will therefore being
Determinism: being therefore will
But is there a tertium quid?
[Charlie] However, the libertarian is committed to the much more difficult claim that free will consists in the power of the opposite choice. That is, no matter what my inclinations and desires might be, I can always choose the opposite. The problem is that now the “will,” detached from mind and appetite, becomes a random number generator. If my choice is not connected to my rational thought process and desires, in what sense is it me making the choice. Faced with the question, “Why did you choose A rather than B?” the libertarian’s non-answer is, “I just did.” If the will is, in the last analysis, always underdetermined by personal factors, then it’s choices are random and impersonal.Also very helpful. I think I see the problem. Once you completely remove the constraints of a person’s nature, beliefs, habits, etc., you no longer have a “choice” in any meaningful sense.
So I guess in Kevin’s full circle observation, perhaps the impersonal fatalist and the libertarian do end up in the same place because not only the events around them but also their own choices are pretty much random. But the “fatalist” in the sense Kevin talks about here is determinism by God. So to be “random,” the fatalist must also believe that God is really making the choices for him for inscrutable reasons. Result: seemingly random.
You end up with person who is not responsible for anything he does in both cases.
Still seems a bit strained, though I’m not sure where to locate the problem.
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
What you call a Biblicist cannot ultimately know that he is saved until he gets to heaven because he could always lose his salvation, regardless of the fact that he is justified, based on faith in Christ alone.What is interesting is that Calvinists also cannot know with absolute certainty that he is saved until he gets to heaven because he could simply be deceived in thinking he is secure but his own evil heart betrayed him into a false hope.
I just came across some Calvinist quotes yesterday that said that very thing. Now to find them…
Also, I disdain that everyone claims this title or that title only to find out they redefined the positions.
Calvinism is Dortian thought. Dortian thought allowed for more general language on the extent of the atonement than some on here probably think. Some who argued for Dortian Calvinism were not particularist. Most limited atonement theory today follows Owen’s thoughts in Death of Death.
At the same time, Arminian thought is the Remonstrants.
If neither of those views reflect your belief, then you are not either.
1 Kings 8:60 - so that all the peoples of the earth may know that the LORD is God and that there is no other.
[Kevin T. Bauder]That man has not saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as he, in the state of apostasy and sin, can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good (such as saving Faith eminently is); but that it is needful that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, or will, and all his powers, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the Word of Christ, John 15:5, “Without me ye can do nothing.”
Theological students who encounter this statement for the first time often mistake it for a Calvinistic affirmation. It is not. For both traditional Calvinists and traditional Arminians, the will has been so affected by the fall that humans, left to themselves, are utterly incapable of any positive response toward God (in other words, they have lost the moral ability to believe). The difference between Calvinists and Arminians consists in how they solve this problem. According to Arminians, God restores some element of moral ability to all humans as an aspect of prevenient grace. Calvinists believe that God restores full moral ability, but only to the elect as part of saving grace.
I particularly appreciated this statement. Historically, Whitefield and Wesley, representing Calvinism and Arminianism (respectively), worked together to oppose those who were teaching that salvation was in the rituals of the Anglican Church. These Anglo-Romanists (as one writer called them) were opposed by these two stalwarts, who both believed a transforming work of the Spirit, not a ritual, was required for salvation.Within Fundamentalism, we have a large number of guys who would claim to lean more to the Arminian than Calvinist side, but when questioned, it’s clear that they actually are more Pelagian, denying that the Spirit need work at all in bringing a person to Christ. Pelagianism isn’t a mere viewpoint. It’s a heresy.[RPittman] The problems arise when we insist on more particular language than the general language of Scripture. One can only assert more specificity by making inferences and inferences are based on human reasoning and are highly variable.Hey Roland, I’m not sure where the idea of general vs. specific language might lead us except to study the words of Scripture to see if in fact they agree with your claim here.
If I’m reading your words correctly (and please correct where I’m not) then you are claiming Christians can’t have certainly that general statements/promises in Scripture are theirs in particular.
If that is what is being asserted in your comments, and in other before you, please take a moment and consider some thoughts from 1 John 5.
1 John 5:12 tells me generally that “he who has the Son has life.” Now, I don’t have my name inserted in that verse, but I do have the witness of the Holy Spirit to the water and the blood on my behalf (1 John 5:6-9, i.e., the work of Christ from baptism to cross), and that testimony is from God and is greater than the testimony of men (v. 9) - includes yours or anyone else’s.
So great is the particular work of God in every born again believer that John writes “we know” an astonishing 15 times in this epistle – 6 times in the 5th chapter alone. Now, if we in fact don’t know, John is a liar. But John’s answer to that charge is that such a person claiming we don’t know makes God a liar (1 John 5:10).
This would seem to call all those in this thread who are suggesting that I, or any genuine Christian, can’t know that he/she is going to heaven as liars, and that God is a liar too. After all, God bears witness to such a powerful extent that “we know” (we have epistemological certainty). This certainty is not based on ourselves, but on the particular work of God by which He bears witness to Christ to us personally. To claim we don’t have that particular work of God, accomplished in us by the Holy Spirit, and in connection with Scripture, is to call God a liar.
So I would disagree with all those in the thread who would claim that people – Arminian or Calvinist - can’t know in specific they are saved, and have that knowledge with 100% certainty. We have the wonderful witness of God (Romans 8:16-17) in particular.
[Aaron Blumer] CalebS… appreciate this:I was aiming for brevity in that post, so I did not spell things out. I must confess that I do not know what you mean by “tertium quid”. And because I don’t understand the language, I can’t respond to the question. Could you restate the question without Latin (I assume that Latin is being used)?[CalebS] Personally, I see one’s understanding of the will to be more determinative of his system than foreknowledge: because of the following paradigm of thought.This is a very interesting possibility and I’ll be chewing on it.
Indeterminism: Will therefore being
Determinism: being therefore will
But is there a tertium quid?
[RPittman] Mike, this is one thing that I am protesting—the pigeonholing of beliefs. People and their beliefs just don’t fit the openings—they share traits common to all the holes. I don’t like categorizing current issues by ancient men, movements, or ideas. I suspect that many, whom you associate their beliefs with Pelagianism, have never heard of Pelagius or Pelagianism. So, I want to get away from these terms ladened with baggage and discuss what is wrong with the modern guys’ beliefs. My passion is for a plain language theology bereft of all the excess verbiage and technical terms upon which no one can agree. Theological terms have accrued too much dust and confusion over the centuries.Hey, I know what you’re saying. I was a Pelagian at one time, as were several good friends of mine (in the sense that we thought people just accepted Christ because it was a good deal, with or without the Holy Spirit’s action in the decison-making process) — though none of us had ever heard the term or would have embraced all Pelagian doctrine. So I call Pelagianism a heresy, though not all who believe like this heretics, since many of them would not even know they are wrong. Serious study of Scripture led me back to a Biblical position within the “orthodox” range of the chart.
As for old terms, I agree that they cause confusion, if only because there is much mischaracterization of them by those on the opposite side. This is nowhere more true than in the debates between Calvinism and Arminianism (though the Dispensationalist versus Covenant guys can approach it). But such terms do serve a useful purpose.
1). No one can master any area of special knowledge without learning the “buzz words” of that area. Those who wish to discuss Bible Study and Theology should learn the terms, because they represent a useful short-hand for communication with others in the field.
2). Such terms can represent a bridge to the past. If I say someone is embracing an Arian view of Christ, that should raise alarms because the church has long since recognized the nature of that heretical, sub-Biblical view of the incarnation. But yelling at the person who is embracing it should not be the first goal; education should be the first goal. Only at the end of a period of confrontation should they be rejected (Titus 3:10).
[RPittman] Mike, this is one thing that I am protesting—the pigeonholing of beliefs.I’m bringing this up in relation to the following material.
[RPittman]Huge assumptions are in play here. Bought what farm? It is simply being assumed that a farm has been bought. The data from G. N. Barkman’s post is too scarce for one to make the statement that he has bought any kind of farm. The point is that this is an example of the question framing fallacy. The post is assuming something of someone that may or may not be true, in order to frame the discussion.[G. N. Barkman] Beg to differ. I believe God has told us, but too many either don’t pay close enough attention, or are unwilling to believe what He said. “No one can come to Me unless the Father who sent Me draws him: and I will raise him up at the last day.” “Therefore I have said to you that no one can come to Me unless it has been granted to him by My Father.” (John 6:44,65)Greg, God has not provided the details. Believing every word of II Corinthians 2:14 and John 6:44-45, God still has not told us how He draws us to Himself. It is an inexplicable paradox that we complicate when we begin making speculation arguments or conjectures. Even your argument is based on inference and fallible human reasoning (i.e. faulty logic) because there is not a clear statement. In other words, you go beyond the basic statement of Scripture with inferential reasoning much like the Arminians. Of course, it is logical and consistent for you because you’ve bought the farm—you have bought into a theological system that ties things together. Thus, it is not that “too many either don’t pay close enough attention, or are unwilling to believe what He said” but we just don’t buy your reasoning and arguments. We are willing to say that we don’t know when God has not said.
It is the Arminian doctrine of Prevenient Grace that is absent from Scripture. Where in the Bible are we told that God enables every spritiually dead sinner to understand the Gospel and believe? I haven’t found it after many, many years of searching. It appears to depend upon faulty logic. Since God commanded men to repent and believe, He MUST have reversed some of the results of Adam’s fall, and given all men the ability to understand and respond to the Gospel? Really? Where does the Bible teach that? I find it teaches the opposite repeatedly, namely that the natural man has no ability to either understand nor receive the things of the Spirit. (II Cor. 2:14)
BTW, I do have a question for you. What is the purpose of promoting your view? What do you hope to accomplish? How am I in a worst or inferior position by saying that I don’t know or understand because God has not revealed the specific mechanism of how He accomplishes this?
RPittman, have you stopped beating your wife yet? I ask this question since it is probably the most common example of the question framing fallacy. If you answer “yes”, then you loose because you have beaten your wife in the past. And if you answer “no” then you still loose because you are still beating her. But the problem is that the question assumes something of another that is not true.
It serves your purpose to “frame” everyone you deal with as having “bought the farm” and as making speculation arguments or conjectures, or as practicing ratiocination. This is to essentially end the discussion before it begins. In other words, RPittman is holding to Scripture, and everyone else that disagrees with him (regardless of how much they have exegeted Scripture) is therefore in a man-made system of thought. Barkman’s point appeared to be that you are generalizing too much with your prior comment. We should at the very least affirm what Scripture is affirming “BEFORE” arbitrarily announcing that Scripture does not speak to the issues; let’s not get the cart before the horse.
What I am protesting in this post is the pigeonholing of beliefs that you do to everyone else, which is to point out a double standard. The doing of what is condemned in others.
If you want the focus to be on Scripture, that is perfectly fine; but please don’t frame everyone else so that they have no connection to Scripture. Then, you will never be corrected by the “body of Christ”.
[Caleb S]Sorry about that. I had you pegged as one who probably knew more Latin than I (not very much). Tertium quid means, roughly, “third thing,” so I was asking if—in your opinion—there is another option besides “will, therefore being” at one end and “being, therefore will” at the other.[Aaron Blumer] CalebS… appreciate this:I was aiming for brevity in that post, so I did not spell things out. I must confess that I do not know what you mean by “tertium quid”. And because I don’t understand the language, I can’t respond to the question. Could you restate the question without Latin (I assume that Latin is being used)?[CalebS] Personally, I see one’s understanding of the will to be more determinative of his system than foreknowledge: because of the following paradigm of thought.This is a very interesting possibility and I’ll be chewing on it.
Indeterminism: Will therefore being
Determinism: being therefore will
But is there a tertium quid?
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
Hoping to shed more light than heat..
[Aaron Blumer]Potential False Dichotomy
Sorry about that. I had you pegged as one who probably knew more Latin than I (not very much). Tertium quid means, roughly, “third thing,” so I was asking if—in your opinion—there is another option besides “will, therefore being” at one end and “being, therefore will” at the other.
It would be really nice if I did know Latin; it would save a lot of time. That is a good question to ask because I don’t want to be guilty of promoting a false dichotomy.
To begin answering, it would be good to restate what this is concerning. The question (and I don’t think that this is improperly framed) is “what determines the will?” Either something determines the will, or something does not. In other words, it is either caused or uncaused. Those two categories seem pretty airtight to me. Now the question may go further and ask concerning different causes of the will, but that is already assuming the status of “caused”.
Now, Norman Geisler says the following in “Predestination & Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty & Human Freedom” p. 74 (IVP Academic: Downers Grove, 1986).
[Norman Geisler] First, let us outline the three major views: moral indeterminism, moral determinism and moral self-determinism. By these we simply mean that a given human moral act is either uncaused, caused by another or caused by oneself.His criticism of indeterminism is much in line with what has already been stated in this thread (impersonal, destroying choice, destroying reason, etc).
However, I don’t find his categories helpful; they rather seem misleading. First, he does not hold to the two categories of determinism and indeterminism. What he calls “moral self-determinism” eventually reduces to indeterminism, for he only backs the causal chain up to self, and then he ends. The self determines the will. So one wonders, what determines the self or the agent, who is exercising his will? There is no answer to this question. What his category of “moral self-determinism” becomes then, is a more highly nuanced “indeterminism”. And then his argumentation against indeterminism ends up slaying his own view.
Second, how he describes “moral determinism”, the kind held by Jonathan Edwards, is just plain poor. He completely omits the fact that this is a moral self-determinism view. The highest motive/desire/preference is what determines the will to choose one way or another. Hence, there is an aspect of the self, which is determining the will. The person is doing what he wants to do; therefore, he is free. Therefore, he is uncoerced/not forced/not compelled. Therefore, he is responsible.
So what is the point? You asked about a third option. I gave my thoughts. Norman Geisler gave his thoughts, and he seemed to speak concerning a third option. However, upon examination, the third option is not necessarily a third option with respect to the “caused/uncaused” issue. But he is offering another option falling under the “uncaused” category, so the “caused/uncaused” categories still remain most basic. If you can find material and/or think of something that really produces another category, I would be happy to read it. Otherwise, I still have to think that I did not make a false dilemma between the two.
Regarding his argument against, what he calls “moral determinism”, I do have some thoughts. However, this seems to go way too far in detail to answer your question.
Paradigm Of Thought
Earlier I mentioned this thought paradigm.
Determinism: being therefore will
I stated things this way because I had libertarian freedom and compatibilist freedom in mind. Geisler adds a hiccup into the mix.
Indeterminism/libertarian freedom
First, if nothing determines the will, then you have an will that is itself the end of a causal chain. You can go no further. Therefore, when one does something, it gives that person a certain character. The common question, “Are you a sinner because you do bad things, or do you do bad things because you are a sinner?” seems to illustrate this nicely. For the libertarian, one’s character cannot come before the act of willing, because that would potentially admit cause. Therefore, what one does determines their nature… . Will therefore being…
Determinism/compatibilist freedom
Second, if one’s will is determined, and it is determined by one’s highest preference, then one can easily speak of a person’s moral nature preceding their choice. They bear fruit in keeping with their nature. What they prefer and desire is also determined by their moral nature. In short, Satan is evil, therefore he desires to do evil, therefore he does evil. The most significant argument against this view is the “author of sin” argument, because eventually the causal chain reaches back to God. However, I do confess that this is the view that I hold, and I have eight reasons why I believe that the “author of sin” argument is flawed… . being therefore will…
The ramifications of these thought paradigms are catastrophic. They affect much of how one is going to read Scripture.
Geisler’s Moral Self-Determinism
As he holds to a person (agent) causing the will, his view seemingly appears to be “being therefore will”. He obviously has a problem with a person causing himself (p77). “No actor (agent) can cause itself to exist. A cause is (in its being) prior to its effect. But one cannot be prior to oneself…” So he grants that being must be before will. However, (1) he never really defines this being, and (2) he never address the problem of why agents continue to exist. So if he defined his view of “being” (that which exists) a little more, then something more could be said. Is this being evil? Is this being holy? Is the term “being” interchangeable with “nature”? Does Geisler include “preference” in the nature of an individual? Etc.
I hope that answered the question; I may have erred more on the side of overstating the case, but I didn’t want to be charged with omitting a potential third category.
Discussion