The Electrum
Those who are beginning to study the debate between Calvinism and Arminianism tend to entertain two related but mistaken assumptions. The first is that the debate involves only two primary positions. The second is that the more extremely one implements either position, the more distant one must be from the other position. The first of these assumptions is simply untrue. The second is true, but only to a point.
Like visible light, positions in the debate between Calvinism and Arminianism form a continuous spectrum. Every Christian who has an opinion on the issues can be located somewhere along that spectrum. The issues that define the positions, however, are not necessarily those that one might expect.
Participants in this debate will be found arguing about divine sovereignty versus human freedom, about the ordo salutis, about the extent of human depravity, about the role of prevenient grace, and about whether election is unconditional, conditional, or corporate. To be sure, all of these questions are important, but they eventually lead to one critical problem. That problem is the definition of divine foreknowledge.
Divine foreknowledge is the hinge upon which all the other debates turn. One’s definition of foreknowledge will determine whether one ends on the Arminian or Calvinistic side of the debate—and everyone who expresses an opinion is on one side or the other.
Arminians see God’s foreknowledge as His foresight. God looks ahead through the corridors of time and sees what free people will choose. For Arminians, divine foreknowledge is essentially reactive.
For their part, Calvinists see God’s foreknowledge as causative. God’s foreknowledge does not passively observe the future, but rather shapes it. God’s foreknowledge makes things happen. According to Calvinists, foreknowledge is not so much God’s foresight as it is His forethought.
Once a definition has been chosen, the other pieces of the puzzle fall into place almost unavoidably. If God’s foreknowledge is causative, then election must be unconditional. If election is unconditional, then divine calling has to be efficacious. That being so, prevenient grace cannot have reversed the volitional effects of depravity. In other words, most of the Calvinistic system follows with logical certainty from a particular definition of foreknowledge. The exception is the negative side of particular redemption—i.e., the denial that Christ provided redemption for the non-elect.
By the same token, most of the system of Arminianism necessarily flows from viewing God’s foreknowledge as foresight. The exception here is the denial of eternal security. Just as some Calvinists affirm a universal provision of redemption, some Arminians affirm eternal security.
This observation implies that shades and gradations exist on both sides of the dividing line. Strict Calvinists affirm limited atonement, while moderate Calvinists do not. Strict Arminians deny eternal security, while moderate Arminians affirm it.
In other words, the debate involves not two, but at least four positions. These are strict Arminianism, moderate Arminianism, moderate Calvinism, and strict Calvinism. Beyond these four, other positions stretch out both sides of the spectrum.
Much ink has been spilled over the phenomenon of hyper-Calvinism. Unfortunately, this term is generally used as a bare pejorative. The abuse of the term, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that a genuinely hyper-Calvinistic position does exist, though its adherents sometimes prefer to call it “High Calvinism.”
What are the characteristics of a hyper-Calvinist? Four particularly bear mentioning. These include the denial of common grace, the adoption of a supralapsarian order of the decrees, the acceptance of a doctrine of reprobation or double-predestination, and a refusal to make a free offer of the gospel. More extreme versions of hyper-Calvinism might also teach the doctrine of eternal justification or a form of antinomianism. To the extent that a person holds these four beliefs, that person is going beyond traditional Calvinism as defined at Dort, and that is what makes the position hyper-Calvinistic.
A corresponding position exists on the Arminian side of the spectrum. This position does not really have a label, but for sake of designation it could be called hyper-Arminianism. How does this position differ from historic Arminianism?
Traditionally, Arminianism and Calvinism take similar views of depraved human nature. This similarity is evident in Article Three of the original Arminian Articles, which affirms,
That man has not saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as he, in the state of apostasy and sin, can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good (such as saving Faith eminently is); but that it is needful that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, or will, and all his powers, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the Word of Christ, John 15:5, “Without me ye can do nothing.”
Theological students who encounter this statement for the first time often mistake it for a Calvinistic affirmation. It is not. For both traditional Calvinists and traditional Arminians, the will has been so affected by the fall that humans, left to themselves, are utterly incapable of any positive response toward God (in other words, they have lost the moral ability to believe). The difference between Calvinists and Arminians consists in how they solve this problem. According to Arminians, God restores some element of moral ability to all humans as an aspect of prevenient grace. Calvinists believe that God restores full moral ability, but only to the elect as part of saving grace.
This original disabling of the will is what hyper-Arminians deny. In their mind, every human being already has complete freedom of will in every sense, and is always and fully able to choose God at any time. Effectively, hyper-Arminianism denies that depravity has affected the human will. (This position is sometimes mistaken for Pelagianism, but Pelagian theology also denies the imputation of original sin.)
In today’s debates, hyper-Arminians often prefer to call themselves Biblicists. They usually insist that they are neither Calvinists nor Arminians. In one sense, they are right: their position is much more extreme than historic, traditional Arminianism. Nevertheless, their definition of foreknowledge places them firmly on the Arminian side of the spectrum.
So does their insistence upon a libertarian definition of freedom. By this definition, the will is not free unless one might actually make the contrary choice. For Calvinists, however, freedom consists in the ability to do what one chooses without constraint or restraint. Most Calvinists have believed that the will can be shaped and even determined in a number of ways without damaging genuine freedom. The debate between libertarianism and compatibilism corresponds closely to the divide between Arminianism and Calvinism.
This debate also propels some Arminians into an even more extreme position. They reason that if God knows our choices in advance, then we necessarily will make the choices that He foresees. If we will necessarily make a particular choice, however, then it is not really possible to make the contrary choice. In other words, even with a “soft” definition of divine foreknowledge as foresight, libertarian freedom becomes impossible.
The logic of this position is really air-tight, and it results in a pretty abysmal choice. One can affirm foreknowledge and remain biblical, but sacrifice reason. Or one can deny foreknowledge and remain logical, but be forced to reinterpret Scripture in radical ways. Those who deny foreknowledge are known as Free Will Theists or Open Theists. For the most part, Open Theists insist that their theology is simply the logical extension of the core ideas of Arminianism.
Opposite to Open Theism is a position that denies any form of human freedom and subjects every event and decision to “hard” determinism. In extreme versions of hyper-Calvinism, this position makes God so much the author of sin that humans bear little or no actual responsibility for their acts. All Arminians and most Calvinists are horrified by these ideas, just as all Calvinists and most Arminians are horrified by Open Theism.
At this point in the spectrum, an odd thing happens. On one end of the spectrum, hard determinism turns into fatalism (choice is merely an illusion, but people are really ruled by fate). On the other end of the spectrum, freedom becomes so loose as to become virtually random, and therefore essentially a matter of chance, luck, or fortune. But fate and luck are simply different names for the same thing. In other words, the two ends of the spectrum meet. Someone who goes far enough in either direction will end up in exactly the same place.
In the present essay, I am not trying to argue for one direction or the other. Nevertheless, I would like to draw out certain lessons. First, understood in these terms, all Christians who express an opinion end up in some version of Calvinism or Arminianism. Second, more than two positions are possible. Both Arminianism and Calvinism have moderate and extreme versions. Third, it is not proper to critique any position by pointing to its extreme expressions, for the most extreme expressions of both directions are identical to each other. Fourth, there is no one distinctively “Biblicist” position. People from extreme hyper-Calvinists to hyper-Arminians (and perhaps many Open Theists) believe that they are deriving their conclusions from the text of Scripture—and invariably the advocates of one view think that the advocates of all the others are overly influenced by extra-biblical considerations.
Nevertheless, some positions are more biblical than others, and that leads to a final observation. The issues that come into play in the “electrum” are of different kinds. Some of them are serious enough to affect fundamentals of the faith. Any position that makes God the efficient cause of sin is blasphemous. Likewise, any theory that denies exhaustively definite foreknowledge constitutes an implicit denial of the gospel. Furthermore, any theory that makes ultimate salvation dependent upon human work or merit damages the very foundations of the faith.
Having said that, Christians of good will should not impute these extreme theories to the more moderate expressions of Calvinism or Arminianism. To say that every Arminian is an Open Theist or a Pelagian is slander. To suggest that Calvinists necessarily make God the author of sin—as if God Himself induced people to do evil—is to engage in distortion to the point of deception. Each position needs to be understood in its own terms and represented fairly.
Other points of argument, however, are of lesser significance. The definition of foreknowledge is important, but it is an issue over which Christians may charitably disagree. The same is the case with the position of faith and regeneration in the ordo salutis, the definition of election, and the role of common grace in restoring the moral ability to choose God. To be sure, these questions matter a great deal, but they are not the sort of questions over which Christian fellowship and cooperation must fracture. We should be able to discuss such things without raising tempers and voices.
Those discussions would be more fruitful if they began with a spirit of curiosity. A Calvinist ought to wonder how an Arminian can hold the system of faith together with putative integrity and consistency, and the Arminian ought to wonder the same thing about the Calvinist. Therefore, the first step in the discussion should not be to look for evidence that the other is wrong, but to discover those parts of the system that make it seem right. Even if we want to refute another position, the first step toward being able to do that is to learn to articulate it in a convincing way. If each of us would extend this courtesy to the other positions in the “electrum,” we might often change the character of the debate.
All Mortal Vanities, Begone
Isaac Watts (1674–1748)
All mortal vanities, begone,
Nor tempt my eyes, nor tire my ears;
Behold, amidst th’eternal throne,
A vision of the Lamb appears.
Glory His fleecy robe adorns,
Marked with the bloody death He bore;
Seven are His eyes, and seven His horns,
To speak His wisdom and His power.
Lo! He receives a sealèd book
From Him that sits upon the throne;
Jesus, my Lord, prevails to look
On dark decrees and things unknown.
All the assembling saints around
Fall worshipping before the Lamb,
And in new songs of gospel sound
Address their honors to His Name.
The joy, the shout, the harmony,
Flies o’er the everlasting hills
“Worthy art Thou alone,” they cry,
“To read the book, to loose the seals.”
Our voices join the heav’nly strain,
And with transporting pleasure sing,
“Worthy the Lamb that once was slain,
To be our Teacher and our King!”
His words of prophecy reveal
Eternal counsels, deep designs;
His grace and vengeance shall fulfill
The peaceful and the dreadful lines.
Thou hast redeemed our souls from hell
With Thine invaluable blood;
And wretches that did once rebel
Are now made favorites of their God.
Worthy forever is the Lord,
That died for treasons not His own,
By every tongue to be adored,
And dwell upon His Father’s throne!
Kevin T. Bauder Bio
This essay is by Dr. Kevin T. Bauder, who serves as Research Professor of Systematic Theology at Central Baptist Theological Seminary (Plymouth, MN). Not every professor, student, or alumnus of Central Seminary necessarily agrees with every opinion that it expresses.
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[Aaron Blumer] Alex… on the validity of the “electrum” idea, and the analogy of a Roman Catholic vs. Grace scale…The point of the RCC…Grace scale was to make a point about the deficiency of Bauder’s one dimensional/linear scale which I have already argued against and resubmit the global position (But for the record Grace is not a personal entity as I used it, rather an embodiment of doctrine well and extensively expressed, but again I am not furthering this argument, it was simply to make a point about narrow considerations).
Everybody either believes the foreknowledge is seeing in advance what will happen or is determining in advance what will happen. There really are only two possibilities there. Or, to put it another way, everybody either believes God determines everything that happens or doesn’t. One’s answer to that question puts him either on the Calvinistic end of things or the Arminianistic end of things.
As for the Roman Catholic analogy… it fails on multiple levels. You’re comparing a large ancient organization to a single local church. You’re comparing personal entities rather than ideas.
There are ideas that more or less fit in well with the Calvinistic view of foreknowledge and there are ideas that fit in well with the Arminian view. These cluster around their respective centers, so, looking at those ideas, we’re all either closer to Calvinism or closer to Arminianism.
This doesn’t work too well with Catholic and Protestant doctrine, though with the right starting point it could. The central doctrine on that scale would probably have to be one’s view of authority. Does apostolic authority reside in the Scriptures or continue in human form through Rome? Then there are doctrines that fit better with one than the other. So it might be possible to make a kind of scale that way.
As to the remainder of the issue, I again resubmit that the “Calvinism….Arminian scale” is too incredulous, even when considering the singular topic of foreknowledge. Not because ideas or views are not similar, close, or even holding some tiny element which may be synonymous with these two schools but because the origins of those views may not come from either, hence it is illegitimate and rather arrogant to attempt to define them with a such a relationship. One can possibly use a linear scale but the two integrals ends cannot be and may not be, Calvinism and Arminianism. At this point I am probably reiterating much of my earlier arguments therefore unless a new point arises I will rest for now.
I see one argument though: the two perspectives on foreknowledge (determination or just awareness) and the beliefs that tend to cluster around them—the two perspectives can have different origins. This is supposed to mean that the scale Bauder describes here is “illegitimate and rather arrogant.”
A couple of things about that.
- It’s really not a problem to refer to a theological viewpoint in terms of those who best articulated it or who are most known for defending it, vs. its origins. For example, we call a set of beliefs “Baptist,” but Bapists believe their origin is Scripture. We call a set of convictions “fundamentalism,” but fundamentalists believe their origin is Scripture. In these cases and oodles more, it isn’t helpful to call them “biblicism,” since opposite views both claim their ideas originate from Scripture… and since lots of other ideas also originate form Scripture. So it’s doubtful that trying to lay out the options according to origin is workable.
- What “ism” we give it is ultimately not the point. Bauder’s main interest here is not what we ought to call these ideas but the ideas themselves. Labels are just handles for talking about things (because using a full description every time we refer to them would be really cumbersome). They are shorthand. But he is also talking about a historical conflict between schools of thought and arguing for what the key is to differentiating them. As Larry and others have argued, it doesn’t much matter whether we want to claim a particular label or not. What we actually hold to is still what it is.
- Can anybody prove they have arrived at their views with no influence at all from Arminius or Augustine or Calvin (or Pelagius)? It isn’t likely. These men had such a huge impact on the body of Christ that it’s doubtful anybody was quite the same after their work.
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
I think you have summarized things well. We are all influenced by many concepts, usually without realizing exactly what they are or where they came from. They are present in the environment that we live and labor in. Studying theology and church history helps to understand these concepts and their origens. It also clarifies the labels. We tend to be slaves of our present experiences. We tend to attach meanings to lables based upon our exposure to people who wear the label. But many individuals are not good representatives of their labels, especially in the historic sense.
Once we understand that a particular doctrine has a history and a long established historical label, we can shake off some of our prejudices and misconceptions. The label becomes helpful to communicate a particular concept without having to restate and support everything all over again, re-inventing the wheel, so to speak. But that works only if the person we are addressing also understands the lable in its historic sense, not in a distorted manner based upon personal contact with a few individuals.
Cordially,
Greg Barkman
G. N. Barkman
[Aaron Blumer]To demand someone prove that the aforementioned men did not influence their theology, at all, is something you cannot prove and have no way of proving and is an *argument from ignorance. Now it might be that since you move in Calvinist circles you believe this is cogent since most of your contacts have such men on their lips rather regularly, however you simply cannot prove this is so, hence you cannot make the prescriptive argument.
Can anybody prove they have arrived at their views with no influence at all from Arminius or Augustine or Calvin (or Pelagius)? It isn’t likely. These men had such a huge impact on the body of Christ that it’s doubtful anybody was quite the same after their work.
*For those of you unfamiliar with the term http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_ignorance] “argument from ignorance” , it is not a discourteous term but a categorical one which classifies a certain kind of informal logical fallacy. I post this to insure no one misunderstands what I am saying.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_ignorance] Argument from ignorance , also known as argumentum ad ignorantiam or appeal to ignorance, is an informal logical fallacy. It asserts that a proposition is necessarily true because it has not been proven false (or vice versa). This represents a type of false dichotomy in that it excludes a third option, which is: there is insufficient investigation and therefore insufficient information to “prove” the proposition to be either true or false. … In debates, appeals to ignorance are sometimes used to shift the burden of proof.
An unstated premise (or maybe I did state it) is that major turning points in the history of theology leave us all influenced in major ways thereafter. It’s not really possible to unhear what we’ve heard or isolate ourselves from others who have been influenced by others who have heard, and so on.
So, given that these men had a huge impact on how everyone has thought after them—on the matters they address—a claim to have arrived at a position on these matters entirely independently is one that seems to need some proving. Whether it can be proved or not is kind of a problem for the ones making the claim… not for the ones questioning it.
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
[Aaron Blumer] So, given that these men had a huge impact on how everyone has thought after them—on the matters they address—a claim to have arrived at a position on these matters entirely independently is one that seems to need some proving. Whether it can be proved or not is kind of a problem for the ones making the claim… not for the ones questioning it.And so the claims and assertions on which the prescriptive one-dimensional linear scale are based remains with just that….the burden of proof for its validity. Simply asserting that “these men had a huge impact” does not prove a case since the case is being used prescriptively (meaning including every single person without exception), unless you have a new standard for such definitiveness. The truth is, it cannot be proven, ever. This makes the scale, prescriptively, invalid and reduced to limited or isolated use at best. And I again say it does have some use but not as broadly as Bauder suggests.
[Alex Guggenheim]I would have to agree with Aaron in the following sense. It is an absolute given that you and I and others grew up in a community. Label me post-modern if you wish; but then I reject Cartesian epistemology and human autonomy, which will throw hiccups into the post-modern label. The point is that one grows up in a community. You and I and others hear, and we are influenced in our thinking. We are predisposed to accept certain things and reject certain things. We even have a “way” of thinking that is adopted by where we grew up. So, epistemologically, human interaction in a community is absolutely unavoidable; and so one is shaped in his thinking.[Aaron Blumer] So, given that these men had a huge impact on how everyone has thought after them—on the matters they address—a claim to have arrived at a position on these matters entirely independently is one that seems to need some proving. Whether it can be proved or not is kind of a problem for the ones making the claim… not for the ones questioning it.And so the claims and assertions on which the prescriptive one-dimensional linear scale are based remains with just that….the burden of proof for its validity. Simply asserting that “these men had a huge impact” does not prove a case since the case is being used prescriptively (meaning including every single person without exception), unless you have a new standard for such definitiveness. The truth is, it cannot be proven, ever. This makes the scale, prescriptively, invalid and reduced to limited or isolated use at best. And I again say it does have some use but not as broadly as Bauder suggests.
Now, granted that one is shaped by his upbringing in a community, one naturally imbibes certain ideas, which came from past communities, and so on. The very nature of human learning itself argues against a position of having no presuppositions or assumptions being brought to the text. People do not learn in a vacuum! Nor can one see meaning in particulars without a grid. Now, given the impact upon your mind by past generations, then it become perfectly permissible for one to point to a past ideology and show that it has remarkable similarities with yours. In that sense, I would agree that Aaron has a very strong point.
The plea that one can set aside all presuppositions or assumptions and approach the text neutrally is just plain ridiculous (understated). I don’t have the time to argue the point now; however, I would simply refer to one book and then provide a link. The book is “Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings And Analysis” by Greg Bahnsen. If you cannot get your hands on this, then I would suggest the following link titled “Inductivism, Inerrancy, and Preusuppositionalism” by Greg Bahnsen.
http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/pt034.htm
Even in fundamentalism today, the Gospel has been distorted in its presentation and many continue lost because they haven’t understood their “lost situation” according to Scripture.
I have been directed to Bahnsen as an excellent extension of Van Til’s work.
DJung
[Caleb S] It is an absolute given that you and I and others grew up in a community. Label me post-modern if you wish; but then I reject Cartesian epistemology and human autonomy, which will throw hiccups into the post-modern label. The point is that one grows up in a community. You and I and others hear, and we are influenced in our thinking. We are predisposed to accept certain things and reject certain things. We even have a “way” of thinking that is adopted by where we grew up. So, epistemologically, human interaction in a community is absolutely unavoidable; and so one is shaped in his thinking.This is not being argued. However, I will say that this reality then bears the exact opposite of the premise(s) one attempts to use for one-dimensional scaling that identifies only two integrals. This makes Calvin and Arminius even more arbitrary.
[Caleb S] Now, granted that one is shaped by his upbringing in a community, one naturally imbibes certain ideas, which came from past communities, and so on. The very nature of human learning itself argues against a position of having no presuppositions or assumptions being brought to the text. People do not learn in a vacuum! Nor can one see meaning in particulars without a grid. Now, given the impact upon your mind by past generations, then it become perfectly permissible for one to point to a past ideology and show that it has remarkable similarities with yours. In that sense, I would agree that Aaron has a very strong point.Again, this is not being argued if a reasonable or substantial relationship can be demonstrated. Much like the construction of a house. We do not find the first two house builders and arbitrarily set them as primary integrals and assign to all other house builders a kind or type of the two. If we travel the globe no doubt we will discover that there are many proprietary kinds of houses though many use some same fundamental principles. It is not the fundamental principles that make them a special class of something, rather their unique properties, their proprietary elements. And in theology, when such proprietary elements are great, we simply must appreciate them and not allow ourselves to fail to assign to them their unique and unrelated status. Simply distancing them on a linear scale and still insisting they are a “kind” or “type” of two primaries does not accomplish that in the least. Now if it is true in some case, fine, but it isn’t in all cases, hence such a scale cannot be prescriptive.
[Caleb S] The plea that one can set aside all presuppositions or assumptions and approach the text neutrally is just plain ridiculous (understated). I don’t have the time to argue the point now; however, I would simply refer to one book and then provide a link. The book is “Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings And Analysis” by Greg Bahnsen. If you cannot get your hands on this, then I would suggest the following link titled “Inductivism, Inerrancy, and Preusuppositionalism” by Greg Bahnsen.No one is arguing that, possibly you are reading this intent into my arguments. And once a principle has been established then one can approach Scripture with such assumptions. What is argued against by most from what I see, since you did bring this up, are the presuppositions derived by means of philosophy/rationalism and not purely exegetical discoveries which establish theological boundaries and certainties. But again I am not arguing that all people always may have all original thought, that isn’t my argument at all.
http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/pt034.htm
[Alex Guggenheim] This is not being argued. However, I will say that this reality then bears the exact opposite of the premise(s) one attempts to use for one-dimensional scaling that identifies only two integrals. This makes Calvin and Arminius even more arbitrary.I never said that it was being argued. And that is the reason for having the first sentence in my previous post, which you have omitted here. That first sentence is very key. I even underlined, that I agreed in the following sense. I was introducing material that I thought was vital, that may or may not have an impact on your discussion. Calling it arbitrary does not make it so; the post (124) establishes an individual to a historical connection. The connection is vital if a historical label is to be applied.
[Alex Guggenheim] Again, this is not being argued if a reasonable or substantial relationship can be demonstrated. Much like the construction of a house. We do not find the first two house builders and arbitrarily set them as primary integrals and assign to all other house builders a kind or type of the two. If we travel the globe no doubt we will discover that there are many proprietary kinds of houses though many use some same fundamental principles. It is not the fundamental principles that make them a special class of something, rather their unique properties, their proprietary elements. And in theology, when such proprietary elements are great, we simply must appreciate them and not allow ourselves to fail to assign to them their unique and unrelated status. Simply distancing them on a linear scale and still insisting they are a “kind” or “type” of two primaries does not accomplish that in the least. Now if it is true in some case, fine, but it isn’t in all cases, hence such a scale cannot be prescriptive.Again, I never said it was being argued. That is why I qualified the entire post with the words you left omitted.
With regard to the unifying principle, I have already expressed what I think is a better “line” upon which to evaluate differing theological systems of thought. And when I say “systems of thought” I am saying this in regard to how people think with regard to Scripture. A person has a worldview in their head; the argument is not whether it is there or not, but the argument is over whether or not this worldview is founded upon Scripture. This is what I mean by “system of thought”. And again, with reference to the “line” I have already expressed a “determinism/indeterminism” spectrum with respect to the will. I have problems with the “foreknowledge” continuum because you have the “Open view” “the middle knowledge view” “the Augustinian-Calvinist view” “simple foreknowledge view”. There are several different views of foreknowledge; perhaps Dr. Bauder has a way of viewing them in a much more simplistic manner that focuses in on the key similarities and differences. For me, “determined/undetermined” is very clear, and it gets to the metaphysical/epistemological root of ton of the debate. To the extent this discussion focuses upon “foreknowledge” I will agree with you. However, to the extent that this discussion of the spectrum line focuses upon the will, then I adamantly disagree with you. It is only the sheer volume of time needed to assemble the correspondence of different systems that is keeping me from writing upon the subject. Hence, I have written in shorthand, which may appear arbitrary to you. Perhaps, Dr. Bauder has done the same, but that is obviously speculation on my part with regard to Dr. Bauder.
[Alex Guggenheim]I must confess that I did not make my address clear; I was functioning on a much more general basis on this last comment. I was specifically referring to those who are commenting that they are simply letting the text speak for itself without having any personal preconceptions brought to the text. And “yes” at least one was arguing that. For example: “No, it isn’t obvious for one with no preconceptions.” Such a statement is ridiculous.[Caleb S] The plea that one can set aside all presuppositions or assumptions and approach the text neutrally is just plain ridiculous (understated). I don’t have the time to argue the point now; however, I would simply refer to one book and then provide a link. The book is “Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings And Analysis” by Greg Bahnsen. If you cannot get your hands on this, then I would suggest the following link titled “Inductivism, Inerrancy, and Preusuppositionalism” by Greg Bahnsen.No one is arguing that, possibly you are reading this intent into my arguments. And once a principle has been established then one can approach Scripture with such assumptions. What is argued against by most from what I see, since you did bring this up, are the presuppositions derived by means of philosophy/rationalism and not purely exegetical discoveries which establish theological boundaries and certainties. But again I am not arguing that all people always may have all original thought, that isn’t my argument at all.
http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/pt034.htm
The prior paragraph was with respect to my original intent and aim; this paragraph aims at what you just stated. I’ll state it baldly. There are no exegetical discoveries devoid of philosophy and rational thought. You are right with respect to “rationalism” as related to “empiricism” if they are understood under the autonomous principle. However, Scripture and philosophy overlap. To say that “God created all things” is a metaphysical statement. To say that God created human language is to argue for a philosophy of language, and one is making a metaphysical statement with epistemological ramifications. There is no such thing as a Scripture devoid of philosophical categories. The prior comment does not assume that you are saying that “all people always may have all original thought.” Nor have I ever assumed that of you, though I confess that I may not be entirely following what you mean by the expression.
Per the last section, my comment about all original thought was taking the expectation to its end, somewhat a hyperbolic extension, but to make a point that anyone proposing no assumptions or presuppositions would have to end up there, that is all that was meant by that.
Per you other points, I understand now your use of these arguments. Thank you. I am still left, however, with the position that regardless of the possible relationship between some or many, the scale cannot be prescriptive without first proving this, which it cannot be, and it cannot be done without ignoring proprietary distinctions which is simply incredulous.
Your more generic scale (“determinism/indeterminism) which does not assign relationships to schools instead investigates varying arguments as they relate to a doctrinal topic (hence making no one subordinate to the other) is preferable if anything when a linear one-dimensional scale is trying to be used in this case. But even then I am not confident all positions or arguments can properly fall within this scale.
[Alex Guggenheim] No one is arguing that, possibly you are reading this intent into my arguments. And once a principle has been established then one can approach Scripture with such assumptions. What is argued against by most from what I see, since you did bring this up, are the presuppositions derived by means of philosophy/rationalism and not purely exegetical discoveries which establish theological boundaries and certainties. But again I am not arguing that all people always may have all original thought, that isn’t my argument at all.Having previously responded to the full post, I took the liberty of deleting what I’m not focusing on; and I bolded what I am specifically focusing upon. Perhaps, upon further examination it will be revealed that I focused upon an irrelevant point, yet I’ll point this out. The bolded section is built off of a “will, therefore being” kind of paradigm. Once a person’s will/mind acquiesces to a principle, then this can be thought to be a part of that person’s being. Even the very nature of the debate itself will reflect a person’s precommitments (as evidenced by the various members of this thread’s discussion). What I have been arguing for is that all people have presuppositions irrespective of their conscious decisions. This is a “being, therefore will” thought paradigm. People exist; they have properties; they have universal/rational elements endowed to them by their Creator; and they have the noetic affects of sin upon the mind; and sometimes believers carry on bad mental assumptions through their actions. Hence, the Scriptural need for one to progressively renew his mind. This is a “being, therefore will” paradigm.
Restated, a person does not just decide to fly by flapping his arms. He does not just “will” it to happen by thinking really hard and focusing on the goal. The problem is that the person’s nature limits/determines what a person can will. In other words, there is a vital connection between a person’s choices and a person’s nature.
Restated, a person drowns if he “wills” to breathe underwater (of course without proper equipment that changes the environment). His nature does not support the activity of breathing water. The person’s nature limits/determines what a person can will.
The same can be said of a person’s “moral” nature; and the same can be said of a person’s “mental” nature. Scripture everywhere either asserts this directly or assumes it.
I editing this to add that I wrote this “before” reading post 128 or knowing that it was written.
Your thoughts are provoking, thanks. My evening is closing somewhat and other duties call so my interaction will be limited. BTW I do not have any problem with the statement:
What I have been arguing for is that all people have presuppositions irrespective of their conscious decisionsHowever, I do not believe that unknown presuppositions (as opposed to those assumptions of which we are aware) and their effect on conscious decisions necessarily have to be viewed always as culprits undermining objectivity (I know you have not argued this per se, I am just making a more broad point) though they may and/or do influence our objectivity to varying degrees in varying contexts. And I do believe some are clearly far more self-aware and have identified and articulated within themselves a great deal of their propositional framework and recognize its direct and subtle presence when operating. But in general the statement above is one that I recognize.
[Alex Guggenheim] Caleb,I glad that these thoughts are provoking. Thanks for your comments as well. I agree that simply having presuppositions does not necessarily have to undermine objectivity.
Your thoughts are provoking, thanks. My evening is closing somewhat and other duties call so my interaction will be limited. BTW I do not have any problem with the statement:What I have been arguing for is that all people have presuppositions irrespective of their conscious decisionsHowever, I do not believe that unknown presuppositions (as opposed to those assumptions of which we are aware) and their effect on conscious decisions necessarily have to be viewed always as culprits undermining objectivity (I know you have not argued this per se, I am just making a more broad point) though they may and/or do influence our objectivity to varying degrees in varying contexts. And I do believe some are clearly far more self-aware and have identified and articulated within themselves a great deal of their propositional framework and recognize its direct and subtle presence when operating. But in general the statement above is one that I recognize.
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