Yes, You Can Forgive Unilaterally

Dan Darling recently wrote a blog post on the topic of forgiveness. As usual with Darling, it’s thoughtful, clear, and helpful. I also agree with him. I want to expand a bit on why I believe he’s right, but first some background.

Some may not be aware that there is a debate on the nature of our obligation to forgive our fellow human beings who wrong us. The central question is this: Does Scripture require us to forgive only when a person is repentant, or can we/ought we to forgive, regardless of the attitude of the offender?

The repenters-only view

A key passage in the debate is Matthew 18, where we find two situations:

• Situation 1: A “brother” does wrong, is unrepentant, and eventually is disciplined by the ekklesia (usually translated “the church”)—Matthew 18:15-20.
• Situation 2: A brother offends multiple times—Matthew 18:21-35.

Another relevant passage is Colossians 3:13, containing the phrase “as the Lord has forgiven you, so you must forgive” (ESV).

Taken together, these passages are understood to teach that Christians are not to forgive unless the wrongdoers are repentant: God forgives sins only in response to repentance.

The unilateral forgiveness view

Darling expresses the view that believers not only can, but must, forgive—even if the wrongdoer is not repentant.

His argument begins with a key distinction:

Forgiveness is not the same thing as reconciliation, which requires two parties willing to come together.

As an example, Darling draws from the interaction between Joseph and his brothers at the end of Genesis. It’s worth noting, though, that reconciliation is also a concept between people in Matthew 5:24 and 1 Corinthians 7:11.

Later, contrasting forgiveness and reconciliation, Darling writes,

And yet, forgiveness is only the first level of engagement with those who have hurt us. The next level, I believe, is reconciliation. But this is often more complicated. In Joseph’s case, it happened because his brothers also engaged and were willing to embrace repentance and restitution. This is not always possible.

Darling has more supporting reasoning in his post, but also a good bit of practical application. His focus is on the heart of the believer and the need to lay aside a spirit of vengeance and bitterness. Throughout the piece, he considers the relationship side of forgiveness from a “levels of engagement” perspective (forgiveness → reconciliation → trust).

To summarize, Darling’s view is that forgiveness is one thing, fixing the relationship (reconciliation, trust) is another. We need to do the former, regardless of the offender’s attitude, in order to reject bitterness. We should seek the latter (Rom 12:18), but the offender may make it impossible.

In support of unilateral forgiveness

I believe Darling is correct that forgiveness can be granted with or without repentance. I’m going to get a little analytical here. Don the cogitation cap.

As I see it, there are at least three variables in play, when an offense has occurred:

• Variable 1: Our personal grievance against the offender
• Variable 2: Our relationship with the offender
• Variable 3: The offender’s status/standing before other parties (other victims, authorities such as church and government, God)

(In reality, that third variable is several, lumped together for simplicity).

Darling alludes briefly to a portion of the third variable:

Forgiveness doesn’t erase the demands of justice, it merely takes the instruments of vengeance out of our hands and releases our perpetrators to “the judge of the earth who deals justly” (Genesis 18:25).

I would qualify “forgiveness” there as personal forgiveness, but otherwise agree.

Three factors mean multiple combinations can occur when someone wrongs me. Eight are possible. Here’s three, to illustrate.

By now, readers may be thinking, “This is all very tidy but what about Matthew 18 and Colossians 3:13?”

I’ll get to that; first, a principle that may clarify: Forgiveness is something that can only occur within the context of a specific relationship. An offense can only be forgiven by the wronged party.

For example, suppose Raphael gets tired of hearing his neighbor Donatello’s dog bark all night. The restless dog, enchained in the back yard, yearns to be free. Raphael sneaks over after dark and releases the dog, who then gleefully heads for the nearest highway and is killed.

Thanks to a digital device, Donatello discovers the dastardly deed! He calls the police, reports the incident, then confronts Raphael.

Raphael insists that he has rid the neighborhood of a public nuisance and should be thanked.

In Dan Darling’s view—and my own on this point—Donatello can forgive Raphael. This means he chooses to let go of anger, resentment, and bitterness and to continue to be courteous toward his neighbor. Reconciliation, though, is not possible until Raphael repents.

What about the law? If there are criminal charges, the matter is between Raphael and the authorities. Donatello shouldn’t hesitate to act as a witness, even though he has forgiven Raphael. He can forgive Raphael’s offense against him personally, but he doesn’t have the authority to forgive Raphael’s offense against the law and society.

Donatello also lacks authority to forgive Raphael’s offense against Donatello’s children (who cared for the dog). Least of all can he forgive Raphael’s offense against God.

What if there are no criminal penalties, but a civil suit is possible for the cost of replacing the dog, plus emotional suffering?

That’s less simple, because civil suits are inherently personal, with the idea of restoring a debt to the injured party. Donatello could make the argument that if Raphael doesn’t suffer consequences, he’s more likely to wrong others in the future. Donatello might also observe that even though it’s not a criminal case, violations of law are involved and justice should be served. Or he might sue just to get some needed cash to buy a new dog. In theory, Donatello could forgive Raphael on a personal level but still take him to civil court.

But maybe Donatello decides his personal forgiveness extends to not pressing charges.

Regardless, his personal forgiveness is separate from reconciliation and, in some ways separate from matters of law.

What about Matthew 18 and Colossians 3:13?

Are these passages compatible with the idea that forgiveness is distinct from reconciliation and can be granted unilaterally? They are.

In the case of Matthew 18:21-22, we are told to forgive one who sins against us. The passage does not state “if they ask.” Even if it did, there would need to be some evidence that the if condition is exclusive, as in, “if, and only if.” This evidence is absent, and the parable that follows (18:23-35) includes examples of forgiveness both with and without any indication of repentance.

The sequence from Matthew 18:15-17 contains a lot of “ifs.” What it does not contain is any reference to “forgiveness.” Rather, it talks about “gaining” your brother. This is reconciliation.

For our purposes, the key word in Colossians 3:13 is “as” (kathos) in the phrase “as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive.^” Does this “as” mean “in exactly the same way”?

Reasoning answers the question. If “as” means “in exactly the same way,” that would have to include:

• after personally atoning for their sins on a cross
• comprehensively forgiving all their sins—past, present, and future
• forgiving only those who are repentant and believe in you

That’s clearly not Paul’s intent. Kathos indicates a comparison, with at least one point of similarity. Since the similarity is not comprehensive here, we have to ask, “In what way do we forgive like Christ did?”

The question has multiple possible answers: generously, fully, promptly, or possibly undeservedly.