Objectivity and Subjectivity

NickImage

People are often surprised—sometimes to the point of disbelief—when they are told that the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity was not a significant concern prior to the Enlightenment. Yet it is so. Granted that generalizations pose risks, from the ancient world until the beginning of modernity the majority of people assumed that they somehow participated in what we would now call the construction of reality. They assumed that the world as they perceived it was an appearance, and that the appearance represented some conjunction of reality and the perceiver.

Consider a rainbow. A rainbow can be seen. It can be described. If one knows the distances of objects on the horizon, it can even be measured. Its colors can be distinguished and their intensity gauged. Yet, as anyone who has tried to find the end of a rainbow knows, it is not “out there.” It exists in a world of appearance, but not in some world detached from and purely external to the perceiver.

Premoderns thought that all appearances were like the rainbow. The entire perceived world, whether seen or heard or touched or tasted or smelled, was always and everywhere shaped by the perceiving mind. Consequently, the distinction between the perceiver and the thing perceived was not absolute.

By this, they did not suppose that no world existed externally to and independently of their awareness. They were quite sure that it did. What they lacked, however, was a direct means of encountering that external reality. The enterprise of philosophy arose (at least in part) because of the desire to find ways of working past perceptions to a knowledge of things as they really were.

That approach to reality (it is called a “metaphysical dream”) began to disintegrate in the late Middle Ages, and it was finally rejected with the beginning of modernity in the Enlightenment. No one was more influential in its rejection than René Descartes. He thought himself capable of positing a distinction between the perceiver and the perceived, or, more correctly, between that which thinks and that which is thought about. The former (the perceiver or that which thinks) is the subject. The latter (that which is perceived or thought about) is the object. For a thing to be objective, it must exist independently of conscious awareness or perception.

The goal of modernity was to ground knowledge in external (objective) reality rather than in the internal (subjective) perceptions of the individual. For this goal to be accomplished, individual subjectivity had to be removed through the rigorous application of method. To the extent that a belief was supported only subjectively (i.e., by individual perception, intuition, judgment, or preference), it could no longer qualify as knowledge.

Consequently, the ideal of objectivity became abstraction, detachment, impartiality, and disinterestedness. The objective person was understood to be dispassionate and interested only in facts, not in perceptions or judgments. Examination of the facts (which are external and objective) would lead to the formulation of truth (which would also be external and objective).

The difference between premoderns and moderns was not over the existence of a reality independent of their perceptions. With some exceptions (Bishop Berkeley, for example), all agreed upon the existence of objective reality—i.e., a reality that existed outside the mind of the perceiver. The question was whether this independent reality could be known in an abstract, detached way. The problem for moderns was to find a method that would eliminate personal perspective in the apprehension of the world. Their goal was not simply to recognize an objective reality, but to invent an objective way of describing and knowing it.

In their quest for objectivity, moderns began to narrow the scope of the knowable. While different approaches were tried (e.g., rationalism and empiricism), moderns eventually came to rely upon empirical observation and quantification as virtually their sole means of gaining knowledge about the world. They developed a complete empirical method involving the measurement of empirical phenomena, the positing of hypotheses regarding the causal connections between these phenomena, and the testing of these hypotheses through experiments that were (in principle) indefinitely repeatable. This method they called “science.”

As a methodological principle, the scientific method forbade its practitioners to consider any explanation of phenomena that relied upon “occult” (hidden or non-empirical) causes. Such causes included not only the paranormal, but also categories like soul and God. Once the empirical method was thought to be the only sure route to knowledge, science was transformed into scientism or positivism. The only plausible explanations had to be found within the web of natural cause and effect. Aesthetic judgments were reduced to expressions of prejudice, and then moral judgments were reduced to mere assertions of preference.

Against a rigorous scientism and naturalism, however, three alternatives flourished. One was Romanticism. The Romantics insisted that feelings are also a way of knowing. Noting that science could offer no justification of intuited realities such as beauty, thinkers like Coleridge and Wordsworth labored to develop a critical method that would vindicate the reality of the aesthetic without reducing aesthetic judgments to exercises in objectivity. While Romanticism (especially Continental Romanticism) moved in some very bad directions, its core commitment coincided with the insights of many classically Christian thinkers.

The second alternative to the modernist fascination with objectivity was provided by Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant recognized the distinction between the world of things-in-themselves and the world of appearances. Not unlike premoderns, he suggested that the mind of the knower contributes something to the thing that is known—indeed, for Kant, that contribution is essential to its knowability. In effect, Kant initiated a delayed implosion of the notion of an abstract, detached knower. His work, published while modernity was still in its adolescence, began the process of dismantling the myth of objectivity. One finds few pure Kantians today, but one is also hard pressed to find contemporary thinkers who do not agree with his central insight: the mind of the knower contributes something to the thing that is known. Authors such as Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi have done much to show that even the empirical (scientific) method rests upon and is penetrated by a web of non-objective commitments.

The third alternative to modernist objectivity was Christianity. From its earliest days, Christian theology had evidenced an anti-objectivist strain. This strain can be glimpsed in Tertullian, Augustine, Anselm, Luther, and, to a surprising degree, in Calvin. It was summed up nicely in Pascal’s jibe at the Enlightenment: the heart has reasons that reason knows not of. This line of thinkers insisted that the most important things, especially God Himself, could not be subjected to abstract and detached inspection. Among more modern Christians, this perspective may be best represented by C. S. Lewis (who also represents the better versions of Romanticism).

The point of the foregoing is not to banish objectivity. If a reality exists separately from the perceiving mind (and it does), then the subject-object distinction must be upheld. If what is “out there” is really real, then there is an object, and knowledge of it can meaningfully be called objective.

If, however, any of the three alternatives to modernism is correct (and I think that they all are, at least in their critique), then humans do not have abstract, independent access to that reality. Our knowledge of reality is always filtered through the apparatus of sensation, perception, reflection, and cognition. The world that is “out there” is not identical to the map of the world that we construct “in here” in our minds. In the process of constructing it, our role as subject invariably introduces personal, non-objective elements that cannot be entirely filtered out. Nor should they be. Without them we would know far less than we do. We might even know nothing at all.

The quest for objectivity does not need to be rejected, but it does need to be chastened and a vital interest in the subjective needs to be reclaimed. Under the best of circumstances, our knowledge is always infused with and supported by a host of personal commitments. We never know anything in a purely objective way. Furthermore, some things can rightly be known only personally or subjectively. Among these are the most important things.

Amazement At The Incarnation Of God
William Drummond (1585-1649)

To spread the azure Canopie of Heaven,
And make it twinkle with those spangs of Gold,
To stay this weightie masse of Earth so even,
That it should all, and nought should it up-hold;
To give strange motions to the Planets seven,
Or Jove to make so meeke, or Mars so bold,
To temper what is moist, drie, hote, and cold,
Of all their Jarres that sweete accords are given:
LORD, to thy Wisedome nought is, nor thy Might;
But that thou shouldst (thy Glorie laid aside)
Come meanlie in mortalitie to bide,
And die for those deserv’d eternall plight,
A wonder is so farre above our wit, That Angels stand amaz’d to muse on it.

Discussion

Sorry, but all I read here is a bunch of assertions without any attempt at justification. I know of no philosophical work which would agree with this history. It certainly does not clarify the confusion created by the previous post. Not to mention it fails to address the theological questions posed by Aaron and myself. Dr Bauder knows the real extended world exists, but he does not know what it exists as. This opens up large holes in his epistemology. How much of what we know is actually correspondent to reality as God made it? If the mind is contributing to our creating of “reality”, what is the extent of its input? That is to say, how much access do we have to the objective world (cf. Psa. 19; Rom. 1:18ff.) and how do we know we have that access? What does this do to General Revelation as usually understood from these texts?

It seems to me this viewpoint (again there are no scriptural supports) leads inevitably into skepticism. For one thing, it is wide open to Hume’s criticisms of induction.

“Knowledge” involves warranted true belief. How is this attainable? And how can we be certain of anything? (i.e. is anything we know not subject to falsification?). And where are we left in our preaching and teaching?

Dr. Paul Henebury

I am Founder of Telos Ministries, and Senior Pastor at Agape Bible Church in N. Ca.

I know of no philosophical work which would agree with this history.
That is not really a helpful statement. Or, at least, it is not executed in a constructive manner.

1) Just because you know of no work does not mean it does not exist.

2) More importantly, what historical outlines are presented by historical works you know of. It seems to me this information would further the discussion. What use is it to simply say, “I have never heard that before, you are wrong.”; without also providing what you have heard that leads you to your conclusion?

Brad, you have missed the point. I am not the author of the article. I merely said that I was not aware of this historical picture from my reading of philosophy. I am not obliged to write out a history myself in order to say what I have said. Certainly, if you wish to inform me otherwise then do so.

Besides, why would you focus on perhaps the most incidental line in my comment? There are bigger issues at stake. I tried to identify some of them. May I suggest you take a little of your own advice and say something of substance, pro or con, instead of falsely representing my views (I did not say “, “I have never heard that before, you are wrong.” That is your fabrication!)

Dr. Paul Henebury

I am Founder of Telos Ministries, and Senior Pastor at Agape Bible Church in N. Ca.

As someone interested in the subject I was only trying to get more help from you. I am sorry I did not communicate my intentions clearly enough. But do you really think “iron sharpens iron” by simply telling someone they are wrong without providing any counter arguments? Or is the point of this forum simply to register our disagreements with everyone?

I do not have a horse in this race, other than being interested in the subject. I have read through Bavinck’s Prolegomena; Buswell’s A Christian View of Being and Knowing; Weaver’s Ideas have Consequences; through parts of Blarimes’ A Christian Mind; along with some relevant Eliot; and hope to get in to Van Til’s A Christian Theory of Knowledge. I was just hoping you might be able to provide a more substantive counter-argument than what you did. But you are right. It was not your essay. Forgive me.

Grace and Peace

This installment helps me a great deal. The distinctions Kevin is making here are not easy to see clearly. Why they matter is even harder to see. But given our culture’s current obsession with “science” (and simultaneous loathing of science: witness the popularity of the Harry Potter saga, ghost stories of one sort or another, etc.) they do indeed matter.

The parts that helped me most…
[KB] The difference between premoderns and moderns was not over the existence of a reality independent of their perceptions. With some exceptions (Bishop Berkeley, for example), all agreed upon the existence of objective reality—i.e., a reality that existed outside the mind of the perceiver. The question was whether this independent reality could be known in an abstract, detached way. The problem for moderns was to find a method that would eliminate personal perspective in the apprehension of the world. Their goal was not simply to recognize an objective reality, but to invent an objective way of describing and knowing it.
The debate is not about the nature of reality, but about our apprehension of it. Most of us do not distinguish between “reality” and “truth.” But I think I’m safe in saying that Kevin does. If I understand him right, “truth” has to do with what we know. I’m not fond of using the word that way. It’s not clear to me how distinguishing “truth” from “reality” is useful.
[KB] Not unlike premoderns, he [Kant] suggested that the mind of the knower contributes something to the thing that is known—indeed, for Kant, that contribution is essential to its knowability.
This is an interesting idea. I wonder if there is biblical support for it. I don’t think the rainbow illustration works entirely. Granted, it’s entirely possible that no two people perceive colors exactly the same way. But assuming there is some objective reality behind the rainbow (and Genesis 9 would require us to believe there is), what are observers contributing to it? I think they only contribute to their own perceptions. The reality is unaltered.
[KB] The point of the foregoing is not to banish objectivity. If a reality exists separately from the perceiving mind (and it does), then the subject-object distinction must be upheld. If what is “out there” is really real, then there is an object, and knowledge of it can meaningfully be called objective.
The trick in our times is to strongly maintain the subject-object distinction without worshiping science as the only way of knowing… and yet avoid going to the opposite extreme of rejecting science as a way of knowing.
[KB] The world that is “out there” is not identical to the map of the world that we construct “in here” in our minds.
Emphasis added to “identical to.” I’m persuaded this is true, though based mostly on experience since I haven’t read the philosophy and weighed the arguments.

Speaking of arguments, the essay doesn’t offer alot in the persuasive argument department. Part of the argument seems to go like this:

- Premodern thinking is better than modern thinking

- Premoderns believed we only know things subjectively

- Therefore we only know things subjectively

(Edit: it might be better to take the argument as an inductive one… something like “Most of premodern thought is superior to most of modern thought…. premoderns believed we only know things subjectively… Therefore it’s likely that we only know things subjectively)

Paul H. seems to have trouble with the second premise and wonders if Kevin’s reading of history is accurate.

I’m not in a position to know if either the first or second premise (or both) is true, though they both seem likely.

Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.

Really, Paul, no philosophical work that says things along the same lines as Bauder? I don’t have access to my library right now, but here are some works off the top of my head that I think would fit the bill.

The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God by John Frame

Passage to Modernity and Religion and the Rise of Modern Culture by Louis Dupre

The One, the Three, and the Many by Colin Gunton

A Secular Age by Charles Taylor

The Beauty of the Infinite by David Bentley Hart

The Fall of Interpretation and Introducing Radical Orthodoxy by James K A Smith

The Theological Origins of Modernity by Michael Gillespie

Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy by Michael Polanyi

Following in Polanyi’s wake, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn

Scientific Theology, vols. 1-3, by Alister McGrath

A Survey of Christian Epistemology and A Christian Theory of Knowledge by Cornelius Van Til

“Right reason” and the Princeton mind : an unorthodox proposal by Paul Kjoss Helseth

Dozens of works by Etienne Gilson

The first few chapters of The Christian Faith by Michael Horton; also, his essay “Covenant and Participation” in the also relevant book Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition

Many of the works of John Milbank, including Theology and Social Theory, Radical Orthodoxy, and Truth in Aquinas

Stuff by Herman Dooyeweerd, but I don’t remember which book.

My Blog: http://dearreaderblog.com

Cor meum tibi offero Domine prompte et sincere. ~ John Calvin

Aaron,

Just a couple of notes in passing. It’s all I have time for.

First, most of us actually do distinguish truth from reality when we are doing the work of the mind. As these terms are principally used, reality is neither true nor false—it simply is. Truth is a function of propositions when they correspond to the state of things as things actually are. Granted, there is a secondary and popular use of “true” in the sense of “actual,” but this is not the use that governs epistemological discourse. Incidentally, there is one very specialized sense in which I think that “Truth” (with a capital T) and reality become synonymous, but that use would require explanation and stipulative definition.

Second, the point of the rainbow analogy is not to deny that an objective reality exists behind the rainbow. Whatever that reality is, however, it is not what we perceive when we see a rainbow. We are not seeing water droplets and refraction. We are seeing a rainbow. There is a reality behind the rainbow that is more objective, but we must access it in other ways. Incidentally, I think that we can and should speak of appearances as realities, but we must never treat them as if they were truly objective or as if they were ultimate.

Third, it makes no difference to my presentation whether or not premodern thinking is better than modern thinking. In this particular essay, I am simply tracing the waxing and waning of an idea (objectivity). Perhaps the premodern evaluation was better, or perhaps it was worse. What is clear is that it was not the same. Abstract objectivity was the invention of modernity, and it has now been abandoned as unattainable. You will be hard pressed to find any thinkers of any persuasion arguing for the desirability or possibility of an abstract and impersonal objectivity today. This kind of fascination with objectivity was an intellectual hiccup, albeit a powerful one. It is now gone, and I for one am relieved that it is over.

I have personally enjoyed reading the last two segments. Dr. Bauder simply has not elaborated upon the Christian epistemology yet, and it would probably be wise to exercise a little patience before going into hyper-critical mode. Don’t people remember Bauder’s distinctions from previous articles? “Reality is out there”. “Reality is up there”. Though I do not remember it coming from him I would suspect his view of postmodernism as being “Reality is in there.”

I’m editing this to add that I had no idea that Dr. Bauder would be responding at relatively the same time, as the post just before this one.

I tend to agree with Paul that this history of philosophy is pretty thin and not exactly the standard line in most contemporary philosophy departments. Indeed:
the mind of the knower contributes something to the thing that is known
was something that, so far as I can tell, everyone before Kant believed in some form or another. Kant’s contribution was to show what things the mind had to know in order to know anything at all. (I’m not going to get into a discussion of Kant’s philosophy here. Suffice it to say that his work is dense and complex enough to admit lots of interpretations.)

If we follow Dr. Bauder’s description of the “moderns,” I think we’d find that only a very few thinkers actually argued for this kind of rigorous scientism. Most of them lived in the early 20th century, and their project pretty well fell apart by the 1950s (and not because of Kuhn). The “modernist” position described here sounds more like positivism.

This history of philosophy comes up often in evangelical works (e.g. Charlie’s list), and I’m not quite sure why. I don’t think it’s wrong, per se, but I also don’t think it’s detailed enough to evaluate fairly.

To know the best of what has been thought and said in the world -- Matthew Arnold

First Brad: Your apology is accepted and your gracious reply makes me wish MY tone were milder! I think if you read my first comment you will see that I put some important questions which arise from Bauder’s line of thinking. I do not have time to write a counter article, and I’m not sure what good it would do anyway. Take this assertion as an example:

…from the ancient world until the beginning of modernity the majority of people assumed that they somehow participated in what we would now call the construction of reality. They assumed that the world as they perceived it was an appearance, and that the appearance represented some conjunction of reality and the perceiver.

Where does he get this from? You will not find it counternanced by the men you are reading. (A fine list btw. Buswell though, is a rampant empiricist. Bavinck, Van Til ground the subject-object relation in God and His revelation - which is the only way it can be arrived at! Blamires intersects these men but complements them well).

Charlie: Throwing bibliography at me (and a jumbled one at that) does not answer anything. These works, while mostly agreeing with the chronology of Bauder, would not paint that history in his terms. E.g. the quotation above! History is not just chronology.

But please, let’s not allow a small sentence to overwhelm the more important issues here. From a biblical point of view, objectivity is revelational and (in large part) accessible. It is not the same as empiricism. But it is the sum of the properties with which God has invested it. and as it is revelatory (Psa. 19:1-4) it must be responded to rightly by those who “think god’s thoughts after Him.”

Dr. Paul Henebury

I am Founder of Telos Ministries, and Senior Pastor at Agape Bible Church in N. Ca.

[Paul Henebury]

But please, let’s not allow a small sentence to overwhelm the more important issues here. From a biblical point of view, objectivity is revelational and (in large part) accessible. It is not the same as empiricism. But it is the sum of the properties with which God has invested it. and as it is revelatory (Psa. 19:1-4) it must be responded to rightly by those who “think god’s thoughts after Him.”
Objectivity is revelational, and this is why I mentioned that it seemed some have forgotten Bauder’s previous articles where he speaks of truth being “up there” (revelational epistemology) as opposed to “out there” (modernism). There is also an article (purely from memory at this point) where he used an illustration of a person trying to drive through a snow covered town without any directions. One can try and arrive at the “map” by trial and error (inductive method), or one can simply look to “revelation” and then find his way about. What you consider the “more important issue here” has already been covered by Bauder’s previous articles; and perhaps, it may be covered once again in this series.

I took a little time and looked back into what Dr. Bauder had previously written, and I believe that he was addressing a lot of these issues in his series on the “Importance of the Imagination.” Specifically, this link has the “car in a snowstorm” illustration that I referred to.

http://sharperiron.org/article/importance-of-imagination-part-3

[Paul Henebury]

Charlie: Throwing bibliography at me (and a jumbled one at that) does not answer anything. These works, while mostly agreeing with the chronology of Bauder, would not paint that history in his terms. E.g. the quotation above! History is not just chronology.

But please, let’s not allow a small sentence to overwhelm the more important issues here. From a biblical point of view, objectivity is revelational and (in large part) accessible. It is not the same as empiricism. But it is the sum of the properties with which God has invested it. and as it is revelatory (Psa. 19:1-4) it must be responded to rightly by those who “think god’s thoughts after Him.”
I posted those works, in admittedly jumbled fashion, because I do think that they support at least some of Dr. Bauder’s claims. But, it’s not always clear what Bauder is claiming, and so far, it’s not at all clear to me what you are claiming. For example, I’m not sure that I’ve ever read the sentence “objectivity is revelational” in a philosophical work.

So, here are some things that I’m claiming and that I think (most of) the works above support.

1. Premodern Christian epistemology, especially in the Augustinian strain, was seriously concerned with the role and state of the knowing subject.

2. The primary significance of Descartes was the subject-object bifurcation, an attempt to discard the individual subject in favor of wholly objective “method.” Descartes was doing this consciously, and his supporters and critics alike recognized what he was doing. One of the results of embracing Descartes is limiting what counts as “truth” and “reality” to what can be ascertained through method.

3. British empiricism disagreed with Descartes as to method, but not on the notion of objectivity.

4. Logical or empirical positivism throughout the 20th century maintained much of this notion of objectivity, but has since undergone various postmodern permutations.

5. Neo-Kantians and Hegelians of various sorts have attacked the Cartesian notion of objectivity.

6. Neo-Thomists and Augustinians (Milbank, Pickstock, James Smith) would generally agree with Bauder’s notions and history.

7. There are myriad postmodern critiques of modernist objectivity that would largely agree with Bauder’s history but disagree sharply with his proposals.

My Blog: http://dearreaderblog.com

Cor meum tibi offero Domine prompte et sincere. ~ John Calvin

Thank you Caleb.

I shall read the article you link to asap. In another article back when, Dr Bauder wrote of his belief that God is “wholly other” and that there is no univocal relation between God’s thoughts and our thoughts. The one would make God totally incomprehensible (thus, the Bible would not be a clear and true revelation); the other would mean that whatever we said about God (or reality) would not coincide with God’s thoughts. It would be impossible to think God’s thoughts after Him.

I have not read anyone yet actually attempt to bring these last two articles in line with a “revelational epistemology” (a Van Tillian term referring to our knowledge being a re-interpretation of God’s knowledge. As far as possible this is univocal in nature, yet, of course, not exhaustive). Thus Bauder’s version of “revelational epistemology” is not Van Til’s.

This post, and its forerunner does not anchor objectivity to revelation, but confines it to the human subject. It also assigns a sort of ‘pre-Kantianism’ to the ancients (but without documentation), whereby they held that the mind actively constructs aspects of reality.

Thus, …from the ancient world until the beginning of modernity the majority of people assumed that they somehow participated in what we would now call the construction of reality. They assumed that the world as they perceived it was an appearance, and that the appearance represented some conjunction of reality and the perceiver.

Noone has yet shown the proof of this, let alone the compatibility between this statement and the Biblical Worldview. This view puts a further distance (along with the two listed above) between the subject and the object. In both recent articles the explanation of objectivity and reality has been immanentistic. This is not what one would expect from someone holding to “revelational epistemology” as usually understood.

If Aaron doesn’t mind me quoting him:

The debate is not about the nature of reality, but about our apprehension of it. Most of us do not distinguish between “reality” and “truth.” But I think I’m safe in saying that Kevin does. If I understand him right, “truth” has to do with what we know. I’m not fond of using the word that way. It’s not clear to me how distinguishing “truth” from “reality” is useful.

Quite! And I would like to see it defended biblically.

Btw, I am grateful that you recognize what is meant by my phrase “objectivity is revelational.” I had written somewhat on this in my comments on the previous article.

Regards,

Paul H.

Dr. Paul Henebury

I am Founder of Telos Ministries, and Senior Pastor at Agape Bible Church in N. Ca.

I happened to pick up a volume at a booksale the other day: The World View of Physics, by C. F. v. Weizsäcker, U. Chicago Press, 1951. I find readings of this kind useful for obtaining perspective upon and for analyzing what Kevin is trying to say.

The volume is relevant because I find in it one “real, live,” mid-century, continental response to the death of objectivity. For instance, after detailing the physical aspects of a “favorite” Icelandic calcite crystal for nearly three full pages, Weizsäcker suddenly notes, “When I took the crystal out of its drawer, I thought at first not of any of the properties we have enumerated, but of something quite different, also belonging to it: its personal relation to me. A teacher whom I liked brought it back to me from a trip to Iceland… . Who says that these subjective realities are less important for a person who wants to make [for] himself a true picture of the world?” (16-17).

Whatever on this earth would cause a scientist to pursue such a question? Hmmm … .

Mark