Now, About Those Differences, Part Seven

[Eric R.] Getting back to the original post (what was it again?), denying the moral implications of music as sound is what leads to philosophies like http://www.worshipmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/Does-God-Even-Like-Our…] this :

[quote Bob Kauflin] Did you ever wonder — What kind of music does GOD like? He commands us to make music, so he must take pleasure in it. Does he like modern worship better than hymns? Rock better than country? Folk better than jazz? What if God’s favorite music is opera? The kind of music God likes isn’t determined by a style, genre, beat, or generation.

Deferring for the moment your other questions for lack of time (though I do want to get to them as this subject interests me), I would ask this: What kind of music does God like? Where does he state that for us? Given we are talking about arguments from 2nd premises and such, where are we even given enough information to be able to come to a conclusion about what God likes in music? Most of what we can conclusively say about God, he has told us. He hates lying, he hates divorce, he cannot look upon sin, and so forth.

Personally, I avoid music that sounds too much like the world, because of its associations and such. And I would also avoid offering to God in worship songs that I find trivial, silly, or inappropriate for a worship setting. And any songs with doctrinally incorrect texts are also out. But even having eliminated the all of those, what do I really know about what God likes in music? If music itself can be morally wrong, then maybe some of the trivial tunes in many hymnbooks are dishonoring to God, regardless of the hearts of the people attempting to use them for worship.

I’m not sure we can answer the question “What kind of music does God like?”

Aaron,

Just a couple of things:

1. If the painting in your example, painted to express ideas against God instead causes all who view it to admire God, is it then a morally good painting, or is it both? (Or does it have any?)

2. I agree that considering morality of an object in the abstract is not really useful in real life. That’s one of the reasons I don’t think it’s actually useful to talk about music being inherently moral (on it’s own, apart from interacting with humans). I simply don’t believe people evaluate music that way even when they think they are. What is more interesting is evaluating its interaction with us in context. However, that is complicated given that different people can have different perceptions, and once we evaluate in context, we are immediately mixing in association and appropriateness, which I would argue are the actual moral qualities being evaluated.

I am interested in your notion that if something has a different morality for each person that perceives it, that is still different from amorality. Does that mean you believe there is such a thing as variable morality? An interesting thought …

OK, I’ve wasted enough thread space on this rabbit trail, and I’m well aware that my view is, shall we say, a minority view in fundamentalism. I do question Don’s view above that he could cooperate with someone who had different choices but the same philosophy (i.e. music is moral, but CCM is OK), vs. someone who made essentially the same choices, but with a different philosophy (i.e. music is inherently amoral, but only music without strong worldly association is OK). I much prefer the music in most fundamental churches (though I lean toward high-church sound) to what would be the norm in evangelical churches, and I would generally oppose going toward the musical sound we associate with a lot of CCM, since it doesn’t sound much different from the world’s music, even though I would disagree with most in the fundamental church on how I got there.

I agree with the main thrust that second premise arguments are necessary. However, we can’t just make up the second premise, and then make strong application from that. The second premise should be something that can be shown to be true. If one makes an application that avoiding evil means one needs to avoid a certain type of music, one had better be prepared to show that that type of music is, in fact, evil. If you are avoiding it on other grounds, then no such proof is necessary.

[dcbii] I am interested in your notion that if something has a different morality for each person that perceives it, that is still different from amorality. Does that mean you believe there is such a thing as variable morality? An interesting thought …

That would be pomo-rality, I think!

[dcbii] OK, I’ve wasted enough thread space on this rabbit trail, and I’m well aware that my view is, shall we say, a minority view in fundamentalism. I do question Don’s view above that he could cooperate with someone who had different choices but the same philosophy (i.e. music is moral, but CCM is OK), vs. someone who made essentially the same choices, but with a different philosophy (i.e. music is inherently amoral, but only music without strong worldly association is OK).

I thought I qualified that a bit in one of my later responses. I think that the person with the different philosophy would inevitably express himself in a way that would demand some distancing at some point. And my cooperation with people who say they have the same philosophy but different applications would be ‘applications within a range’. In other words, I would question someone who said their philosophy was the same as mine but in application were wildly different, like incorporating rap or grunge or something like that. The range I can tolerate to some extent would allow for, say, Southern Gospel style, but it wouldn’t be my choice for a steady diet in our church etc.

[dcbii] I much prefer the music in most fundamental churches (though I lean toward high-church sound) to what would be the norm in evangelical churches, and I would generally oppose going toward the musical sound we associate with a lot of CCM, since it doesn’t sound much different from the world’s music, even though I would disagree with most in the fundamental church on how I got there.

Your applications makes me think that at bottom you and I don’t think that differently. We probably aren’t communicating our views as precisely as we think.

[dcbii] I agree with the main thrust that second premise arguments are necessary. However, we can’t just make up the second premise, and then make strong application from that. The second premise should be something that can be shown to be true. If one makes an application that avoiding evil means one needs to avoid a certain type of music, one had better be prepared to show that that type of music is, in fact, evil. If you are avoiding it on other grounds, then no such proof is necessary.

I agree with you here.

[Mike Durning] Don, I don’t believe the things themselves, either in genre or style, possess any moral qualities.

You know Mike, it’s interesting to note that movies made in America are transported all over the world. Subtitles are added so that they can be shown in various countries. But the music is never changed and always has the same effect on the audience. It would seem that there are some universal communicational attributes of music that transcend cultural context.

[Chip Van Emmerik]

[Mike Durning] Don, I don’t believe the things themselves, either in genre or style, possess any moral qualities.

You know Mike, it’s interesting to note that movies made in America are transported all over the world. Subtitles are added so that they can be shown in various countries. But the music is never changed and always has the same effect on the audience. It would seem that there are some universal communicational attributes of music that transcend cultural context.

But what does it communicate? It doesn’t communicate propositional truth or else they wouldn’t need the subtitles.

[Don J] I think Dan’s two points are correct, and speak to denotation and connotation. Some things are wrong because of what they denote (inherent meaning). Other things are wrong because of what they connote (cultural context).

Don, I would say, “connotes [I] to or from a human[/I].” It’s important that such connotations only can exist where they are perceived to exist.

[dcbii] 1. If the painting in your example, painted to express ideas against God instead causes all who view it to admire God, is it then a morally good painting, or is it both? (Or does it have any?)

In that example, it would be morally good as far as effect on viewers/contemplators is concerned, morally bad for the artist. It could still be morally bad for some viewers in other ways such as motive, stewardship of resources (taking the time to go see it, paying gallery admission, etc.), etc.

[dcbii] I am interested in your notion that if something has a different morality for each person that perceives it, that is still different from amorality. Does that mean you believe there is such a thing as variable morality? An interesting thought …

All “objects” are part of morally variable scenarios. The issue of Playboy, for example, is serving a morally good purpose when it’s kindling for the wood stove on a cold day! You can think of a “good” purpose for almost anything. But “amoral” as I’ve seen people use the term in reference to music (w/o words) is like a lump of natural clay. Usually, they are trying to narrow the morality of use down to very few possibilities in order to support the conclusion that “it’s the words that count.” So there’s a pretty silly reductionism going on there. There are a zillion moral factors in the use or creation of any object, including a piece of music.

Once you go from something God made to something a human being made, you already have a thing with moral significance attached to it. Some of the factors that define its morality are very variable, others less so, some perhaps not at all.

One part of the whole soup I’m still wrestling with is objective meaning.

To go back to the example of the guy who makes a painting with the purpose of expressing his bitterness toward God, though it’s possible for viewers of that piece to interpret it quite differently (perhaps because the artist completely failed to communicate what he intended), what does the piece really mean? Supposing that its “objective” meaning is its meaning in God’s eyes, are we free to interpret it differently? Are we really redeeming it if we do so, or does God judge our use of the object as the use of something objectively anti-God? See what I’m saying?

I don’t know the answer to that.

But the effect/impact of things on humans who use them is only one factor in measuring the morality. The most obvious message (in the case of music, the lyrics) is only one factor.

Then you have the whole area of conventional meaning: what groups of people in a culture generally take a style of art to “mean.” We always live in a cultural setting of some sort so it’s silly for us to imagine that we can reverse the meaning a culture generally assigns to something by giving it different words—or, as in the case of a painting, depicting different scenes (but still in a style that has a contrary conventional meaning). This is why, for example, we’re kidding ourselves with “Christian hip hop,” and—even though it’s a good 30 yrs old now, “Christian metal.” These styles have meaning in our culture and it’s a bit like painting a vampire and putting a clerical collar and cross around his neck. A paradoxical image.

In general, I think it’s better to use terms like “variable morality” or “complex morality” rather than “amorality” because the latter tends to contribute to a “style doesn’t matter” attitude, whereas the former assumes style matters and asks, how does it matter from case to case?

[dcbii] I do question Don’s view above that he could cooperate with someone who had different choices but the same philosophy (i.e. music is moral, but CCM is OK), vs. someone who made essentially the same choices, but with a different philosophy

I think Don’s idea has some merit because a different philosophy is likely to make different choices. I’ve wrestled with this one a good bit from a pastoral standpoint. There are aspects of church life that, ideally, should be internally motivated. That is, getting folks on the same page in their thinking by the teaching of Scripture should result in similar conduct without imposing rules. Can this happen with music? I believe it can to a degree. People who share a philosophy about what music in worship is for, what qualities it ought to have, etc., tend to arrive in roughly the same ball park, provided they take that philosophy seriously. But it only goes so far. I’ve seen this with the principle of modesty as well. Seems like you can get alot accomplished via teaching but then you have a few who will officially own the principles but seem to be unable (or unwilling?) to connect dots… and sometimes you have to do it for them, it seems.

It seems to me that the watershed between simple morality and complex is multiple cultures.

If God’s people were uniform in culture they would find morality simple. Very simple - such that the good or bad underlying heart attitudes would become basically indistinguishable with the signs that connote them.

With the church’s mission to the Gentiles, God’s people became varied in culture. And morals became complex. Maybe a hint of that is seen in 2 Kings 5.

[Sorry, had trouble getting bullet lists to work correctly]

[Aaron Blumer]

FWIW, I do believe “music is moral.” Technically, I think I’d rather say it’s “creating, performing and listening to music” that is moral. What it’s being used for is just one of the ways the morality of it is shaped. I think a whole lot comes as well from what the music means, and that meaning occurs on many levels: what it means to the composer, what it means to the listener, what it means “objectively” (to God—and the angels, I suppose). All of these shape the morality of the acts of composing, performing, listening, etc.

Wow. I started a response to this thread on music last week, then decided not to post for fear it would get things too much off topic. However, upon returning today and catching up on new the posts, I see the music focus is still alive and well :-).

It seems most everyone is in agreement that saying merely “music is moral” or “music is amoral” is unhelpful in gaining clarity (except for the purpose of pointing out why it’s unhelpful). The problem, as Aaron’s response above illustrates, is that these statements are not specific enough. Either statement, if properly qualified, can be shown to be true (illustrated by the disucssion here on the thread). In my own teaching, I’ve illustrated this by pointing out that the statement “music is amoral” is about as helpful as saying “words innately (i.e. a combination of letters on a page) are amoral.” There is a sense, technically, in which that latter statement is true. However, that fact is not really useful in a practical sense, because the moment you begin combining those letters of the alphabet into words they become agents which convey meaning. The meaning is conveyed in multiple ways (formal definition, verbal context, associational context, vocal inflection, poetic beauty [rhythm & meter, pace] ). The same thing is true of music: When a sequence of innately amoral pitches and tones are put together creatively to form music, they become conveyers of meaning, too. As Dave and others pointed out, what makes the morality of music more difficult to grasp for people than the morality of words is that the meaning conveyed by words is more precise and cognitive.

However, I think there is something further that needs to be pointed out very specifically (and this was a watershed for me once I grasped it): Music’s meaning is directed primarily at the emotions or affections. Jonathan Edwards makes the point very well in Religious Affections

And the duty of singing praises to God seems to be appointed wholly to excite and express religious affections. No other reason can be assigned why we should express ourselves to God in verse, rather than in prose, and do it with music but only, that such is our nature and frame, that these things have a tendency to move our affections.

In my opinion, when discussing music with Christians who are more libertine in that area, rather than debating the “music is amoral” statement, it would be much more effective to quickly concede that point (with the qualifications above), then move on and try to gain agreement on the following:

• Words are conveyors of both cognitive and emotional meaning: They influence us in the realm of our thoughts and, to varying degrees, also the realm of our affections. Music conveys primarily emotional meaning. It influences us in the realm of our affections.
• Music’s affect, when combined with words, is similar in many respects to the effect that our vocal tone or facial expression has on our words:
  
  - It has the ability to reinforce or emphasize our intended meaning by evoking the same sort of emotions that the words themselves demand.
  
  - It has the ability to color our meaning by providing emotional nuance that would be absent in the words alone. Note: This “coloring” of meaning can be either intentional or unintentional. When intentional and well-done, this quality of music enables more and deeper meaning to be conveyed with fewer words. (E.g. the word “love” has a broad range of meanings, but the way it is sung can make it clear which type of “love” is being sung about.)
  
  - It has the ability to detract from or even reverse our meaning.
• Music can attain a moral dimension based on the type of affections (or emotions) it generates. Affections (or emotions) can be ordinate or inordinate. Affections are inordinate if they are directed at wicked things. Affections, even when directed at good things are inordinate if they are not appropriate to the relative virtue of that thing.
• Music can also attain a moral dimension based on associational elements. In this way it is also similar to words. Certain words are considered appropriate and others with the precisely the same definitional meaning are considered coarse or crude. The coarseness or crudeness of a word has nothing to do with that word’s innate characteristics (except, perhaps, in the case of onomonopia) , nor does it always have to do with its dictionary definition. A word can attain the quality of coarseness from its identification with certain types of people who use that word and the immoral context in which they use it. I had this discussion recently with my kids in the context of the the use of so-called “bathroom words.” We discussed how that at the times when “nature calls” there are a range of ways to express that need, some more polite than others. I used that occasion to instruct them about the reasoning behind the language etiquette we use: First, not being unnecessarily explicit when referring to unpleasant things in order to be considerate of others. Second, using polite synonyms rather than course words when more specificity is necessary. On the second point, I explained the reason some words are acceptable and some aren’t (due to their identification). My children had no trouble understanding how a word could be unacceptable to use merely because of its identification—even though that word may have precisely the same dictionary meaning. We also discussed how certain words that were acceptable many years ago could become unacceptable due to associational elements. It seems to me that same association/identification rationale that applies to words also applies equally to music.
  
  I think it’s this association/identification element that we’re usually referring to when we say that a certain type of music is “worldly music.” However, I think the term worldly has been used so much that we need to be mor specific in the way we define. Nothing that God’s Word makes permissible is worldly merely because sinful people use it. However, it can, in fact, be worldly if it becomes identified with particular sinful practices or attitudes. Applying this to music: it is possible for a particular style of music to become worldly and sinful based on identification with sinful elements within the culture. Years later, that same music may lose that identification and may, therefore, no longer be worldly.
  

.

Thank you, Phil, that was very helpful.

[Greg Long] Thank you, Phil, that was very helpful.

It was helpful to me.

Phil, I also thought that was a good post. I have written more on this previously. I think I agree with you.

I would add two things:

- music not only influences our affections, but also serves as a display of our affections.

- music does this in ways that might or might not be physiologic and universal (at least to humans).

What I intended to say by my watershed comment is that the correlation between a particular musical form and a particular affection will be very strong IF the music occurs completely within ONE culture. Inside that culture, the affection displayed by the musician will match strongly the affection perceived by the listener. Thus, morality will be simple.

When two different cultures display and perceive affections in dissimilar ways, morality becomes more complex.

[Dan Miller] Phil, I also thought that was a good post. I have written more on this previously. I think I agree with you.

I would add two things:

- music not only influences our affections, but also serves as a display of our affections.

Agree. Good point.

[Dan Miller]

- music does this in ways that might or might not be physiologic and universal (at least to humans).

I agree that this is true within a range. I think (though I don’t know how to prove it ) that certain styles of musical expression convey, within a range, certain emotions in a way that is virtually universal across cultures and time periods. I would compare it to the way facial expressions convey emotions: All cultures across all times know the difference between a happy expression and an angry one. Thus when the Bible speaks of a “joyful countenance” we know exactly what it’s talking about. To some degree, this defies analysis. I don’t know how to define, scientifically, a joyful countenance, and wouldn’t know how to begin to write a step-by-step manual on how to teach someone who does not experience emotions to smile. However, even small infants know the difference between a joyful countenance and an angry one. I think the same is true of certain styles of music.

I think an excellent illustration of this is the song http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nh17BI7ztA0] “Mansions of the Lord” that was performed at Ronald Reagan’s funeral. (If you follow the link, the music starts around the 1:00 mark). When the funeral was broadcast, this piece was heard by a diverse range of cultures all over the world. It has a has a sober, majestic quality (the music itself, not just the words) that I believe was communicated cross-culturally. Although different cultures and different individuals likely experienced that sobriety and majesty in a varying range of degrees, you’d have a hard time convincing me that any culture interpreted it as trite or funny. The music itself carried emotional content that was deemed appropriate to the sobriety of the occasion. It is not difficult to imagine how someone could have taken the words to that song and created a completely different sort of musical arrangement that, if played at the funeral, would have created a very different cross-cultural effect—one that would have been regarded as inappropriate to the occasion and disrespectful of President Reagan and his high office. (You could pick various examples to illustrate here. Right now, I’m thinking about something with a banjo accompaniment and a “lighter” melody [think “Foggy Mountain Breakdown” style].)

[Dan Miller]

What I intended to say by my watershed comment is that the correlation between a particular musical form and a particular affection will be very strong IF the music occurs completely within ONE culture. Inside that culture, the affection displayed by the musician will match strongly the affection perceived by the listener. Thus, morality will be simple.

When two different cultures display and perceive affections in dissimilar ways, morality becomes more complex.

Agree. Although I’d say “morality will be simpler” rather than “morality will be simple.”

BTW, I didn’t intend to make a jab at your “watershed” statement, although the juxtaposition of our two messages made it appear so. (I was responding to earlier postings.)

[PhilKnight]

[Dan Miller]

- music does this in ways that might or might not be physiologic and universal (at least to humans).

I agree that this is true within a range. I think (though I don’t know how to prove it ) that certain styles of musical expression convey, within a range, certain emotions in a way that is virtually universal across cultures and time periods. I would compare it to the way facial expressions convey emotions: All cultures across all times know the difference between a happy expression and an angry one. Thus when the Bible speaks of a “joyful countenance” we know exactly what it’s talking about. To some degree, this defies analysis. I don’t know how to define, scientifically, a joyful countenance, and wouldn’t know how to begin to write a step-by-step manual on how to teach someone who does not experience emotions to smile. However, even small infants know the difference between a joyful countenance and an angry one. I think the same is true of certain styles of music.

I think the facial expression analogy can be extended to also illustrate Dan’s point. If I am extremely angry, people across all cultures would be able to look at me and recognize my “angry countenance.” However, they may not be able to pick up on more subtle facial cues that my wife, because she knows me well, would recognize instantly. For example, she may be able to pick up on more subtle indications of anger, or the fact that I disagree with what was just said. Within our family, we might have certain facial expressions that are meaningful because we relate them to certain things we have experienced together. Thus, a very subtle facial expression that means nothing to others, may elicit a private, shared chuckle among us: it is understood within the “culture” of my family. Worse, though, is the case where that facial expression means one thing (something entirely innocent) to my family, but another thing entirely different to others outside my family: it is understood differently within the “culture” of my family. In the same way, music can communicate things within a given culture that are either: (1) not perceived at all outside that culture or (2) perceived differently outside that culture.

[ PhilKnight] I agree that this is true within a range. I think (though I don’t know how to prove it ) that certain styles of musical expression convey, within a range, certain emotions in a way that is virtually universal across cultures and time periods.

Yeah, that has been discussed quite a bit here. Actually it was during SharperIron 2.0.

I’m glad you said you don’t know how to prove it, because with that included, I agree. There is a tendency to feel deeply that one’s perception of particular emotions in a particular music style are surely felt by everyone. The strength of this tendency is demonstrated every time an English speaker instinctively tries to clarify to a non-English speaker by repeating louder in English. That tendency is not helpful when dealing with other cultures.

I think that this notion of universality can become a tool to reinforce that tendency by making it seem “scientific.”

It must be remembered that the act of designating an expression as approaching universal is an act that must have a basis in the observation of people. It is therefore ridiculous to conclude “universal” and then to tell a large group of people who do not perceive that meaning that they are wrong. If that is done, it is an abandonment of science, because it refuses to recognize observations that contradict that universality.