Book Review - Waiting for the Land: The Story Line of the Pentateuch

First and foremost, thank you for your response; I appreciate the criticism as it makes me think and evaluate. Regardless of what I will state about the potential problems of the literary theological method, I appreciate having to deal with a potential objection.

[Paul Henebury] You have written much. Some of it I agree with, some I think is off-subject, and some I disagree with. I wish I had time to “pin you down” on your comments, but one can spend too much time on forums and I got what I came for. Your first post would clearly have you in the camp of those who believe the church is in the OT (i.e. the “boy” in the horse & buggy scenario is the same boy). You did not address Jer. 33:14-26, but, then, that is usually the case with brethren who reject plain-sense interpretation (the kind you took for granted when you wrote your posts) :-)

-Again, “plain sense” is just like “literal”; it is virtually meaningless. You cannot take for granted a non-entity.

-It would be a straw man for you to say that my post leaves me in the camp of those who believe the church is in the OT. The options are not just (1) either the church is Israel or (2) the church is not Israel; that would be a false dilemma. Your comment does not do justice to the continuity AND discontinuity inherent in my position. Even in the illustration, it is not the same boy even though it is the same boy, for he is older in the second. There is a continuity and a discontinuity, and no this is not me speaking out of both sides of my mouth, for the labels apply to different areas.

-Jeremiah 33:14-26 was indirectly address rather than directly addressed. Part of the reason is that my understanding of Scripture is still a work in progress.

[Paul Henebury] You refer to a “literary-theological exegesis.” But this would permit the interpreter to read a text with their theology already in hand - a rather perilous way to discover what a text is saying. After all, we do exegesis to find out what God is saying so that we can build an accurate theology. And to grasp the literary structure one would have had to study the text first. But then how? Thus, while your favored method may produce good results after exegesis, it cannot be employed in initial exegesis. Richard Hess (cited above), Allen Ross, and John Sailhamer employ literary-theological interpretation where appropriate. But they don’t use it until they “know” the text. As Sailhamer says, we must read and re-read the Bible. There is no substitute for it. When we have a grasp of a Book, we may then spy literary, compositional and theological links within it.

-I can assert a Biblical doctrine of grace, but it can be abused by “sinning it up”. I can carefully explain and assert the Trinity, but it can be abused to form “tritheism”. Dr. Henebury can explain and assert the “plain” meaning of the text, but it can be abused by the reader assuming that his idea of “plain” is what the author of Scripture intended when in reality it is just his modern bias being read into the text. Sovereignty can be taught, but it can be abused where people don’t move into action in their Christian lives. Responsibility and relationship can be taught, and then it can be abused by the promotion of Open Theism. The point is this. The abuse of something good is no argument against its validity; it is only an argument pointing to the corruption of man. So, while a literary theological method can be abused; it is no argument against its validity. This is especially true when the ancient historiography matches the method, which I tried to warn you that I did not write everything that could be written on the subject.

-Regarding looking into the text and doing exegesis: What do you think that I’m talking about? You must have a horrible idea of what I’m saying because we are clearly not on the same page in the definition. Of course, one looks into the text; none of your post pointed out the textual points that I indicated. Rather, they were simply glossed over, and then the worst was assumed. Certainly, anachronism needs to be avoided, and the text needs to be studied, but don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater.

[Paul Henebury] We are all trying to understand what on earth God meant when He spoke. To me it is a case of reading God’s Word as I would read most anything else - yes, even poetry (though not the intentional gibberish of modern stuff). That is how I know God created the world. That is how I know Christ died on a Roman Cross and not a Roman slave ship. That is how I know justification is by faith and through the power of Christ’s physical resurrection. In fact, every basic doctrine is arrived at via this “literal” method (Again, every author who wants to be understood wants to be taken “literally.” Yes, “literal” like any other term, is hard to define with absolute philosophical precision. But it works for most communication. I see no reason to give up on it when reading scripture).

-What God meant was often conveyed through a human author. Hence, we have personality coming through in the NT books. One author writes in one way, and another writes in another. This is an aspect of “preparation” in the whole doctrine of inscripturation. God often did not simply use mechanical dictation. Hence, it is entirely proper to speak of ancient historiography as affecting how the author wrote the OT.

-Reading God’s word just like anything else is a perfect recipe for not taking into account the Biblical worldview and the historical context. Distanciation is not being practiced when one does that. You get on to me for reading a theology into the text when your method makes it almost certain that a person will read modern assumptions into the text: double standard.

-again, “literal” is an undefined meaningless term that often just means I can read my theology back into the text and call it literal. A case in point is that the Open Theist is reading the text “literally” when he takes God at his word when God asks Adam where he was. God must not have known; therefore, Open Theism is proved through the “literal” method.

[Paul Henebury] I believe I can use it to unify the Testaments without needing to constantly call upon typology, symbol, allegory, etc. I may be wrong of course (and I’m sure I am 20% of the time). But I don’t think abandoning the plain-surface meaning is the way to go.

I am not here to debate dispensationalism. I couldn’t care less about defending a system (I defended Dispensationalism against the 95 theses because they were ridiculous and unfair). I am interested, as are we all, in correct interpretation. That is why I asked my questions.

I’m afraid I shall have to leave things there. Over at my http://drreluctant.wordpress.com/2011/10/10/let-god-be-true-and-say-wha… blog I have written more on this issue, and shall do so in future (DV). Perhaps you might pop in there?

God bless you and yours,

Paul H.

-regarding typology, symbol, allegory: I don’t know who you are talking to. Perhaps it is someone else’s position.

-I agree very much that we are interested in correct interpretation.

-regarding defending dispensationalism: my focus was on the sine qua nons, of which you are seeking to follow the “literal” sine qua non. I’m giving you a bit of grief on that point.

the typical dispensational distinction between Israel and the church is assumed.

Why do people say this distinction is assumed? I would say it is derived from exegesis. The “assumption” is that biblical language works just like normal language. When we assume that, the distinction between Israel and the church flows out of the text itself, I would argue.

The gross imprecision of the meaning of “literal” hermeneutic. Closer inspection tends to reveal that “literal” means what the system reads back into the term. Closer inspection reveals that “literal” is not really literal in the sense of being opposed to the non-literal, for literal somehow encompasses the metaphorical non-literal elements of speech. My discussions with dispensationalists have tended to be “goal post moving” sessions where I’m trying to pin down the meaning, while the other keeps shifting the categories. What is literal?

There are no doubt some who use it imprecisely (on both sides). But I would not build your case on the worst of dispensationalism, anymore than I should build my case on the worst of one of the alternatives.

“literal” is an undefined meaningless term

It’s not really undefined. Here are three definitions:

“This recognition of a metaphorical style is not to be thought of as a return to allegorization, nor is it a “spiritualizing” of the passage. When a writer employs metaphor he is to be understood metaphorically and his metaphorical meaning is his literal meaning: that is to say, it is the truth he wishes to convey. The term “literal” stands strictly as the opposite of “figurative,” but in modern speech it often means “real,” and it is used this way by those who want to be sure that they know what the writer really and originally meant. In this sense a metaphorical saying is “literally” true. … Thus a metaphorical statement is “literally” true but cannot be “literalistically” true. The “literal” meaning, then, is what the particular writer intended, and although he used metaphor, no one familiar with the language in which he expressed himself could reasonably misunderstand him” (Kevan, “The Principle of Interpretation,” in Revelation and the Bible, ed Henry, p. 294).

“Dispensationalists claim that their principle of hermeneutics is that of literal interpretation. This means interpretation that gives to every word the same meaning it would have in normal usage, whether employed in writing, speaking, or thinking. It is sometimes called grammatical-historical interpretation since the meaning of each word is determined by grammatical and historical considerations. The principle might also be called normal interpretation since the literal meaning of the words is the normal approach to their understanding in all languages. … Symbols, figures of speech, and types are all interpreted plainly in this method, and they are in no way contrary to literal interpretation. After all, the very existence of any meaning for a figure of speech depends on the reality of the literal meaning of the terms involved” (Ryrie, Dispensationalism, p. 80).

“The literalist (so called) is not one who denies that figurative language, that symbols, are used in prophecy, nor does he deny that great spiritual truths are set forth therein; his position is, simply, that the prophecies are to be normally interpreted (i.e., according to the received laws of language) as any other utterances are interpretation—that which is manifestly figurative being so regarded” (Lange, Revelation, cited in Ryrie, p. 81).

So I don’t think anyone who knows what they are talking about argues that literal is the opposite of figurative or or metaphorical. Literal encompasses figurative and metaphorical. Literal is normal. The opposite would something like spiritual or allegorical.

I think the mistake made by the opponents of dispensationalism is focusing on the meaning of “literal,” and thus saying something that dispensationalism doesn’t say. The real issue is not “literal” vs. “figurative” but the “consistent use” of literal or normal hermeneutic. The problem with the alternatives to dispensationalism is that they are inconsistent in their use of a normal hermeneutic when it comes to the Scripture. So going after dispensationalism based on “literal” is the wrong tack, IMO, first because the opponents use the exact same hermeneutic, and second, because they don’t use it consistently.

[Larry]

the typical dispensational distinction between Israel and the church is assumed.

Why do people say this distinction is assumed? I would say it is derived from exegesis. The “assumption” is that biblical language works just like normal language. When we assume that, the distinction between Israel and the church flows out of the text itself, I would argue.

I apologize for the lateness of getting back to you, and I hope that you don’t miss the response because of moving on to other things due to the progress of time. This just happens to be a time of life where I can interact again in this forum. Larry, you make some good observations, and I hope to provide some good interaction with it. When it comes to my statement about the Israel/church distinction being assumed, I think that I was specifically speaking in regard to Paul’s question in particular. His question assumed the distinction, so it was my aim to point out the assumption and note the false dichotomy (either the church is Israel, or the church and Israel are completely distinct). I was not speaking in general, like your address appears to assume. However, to deal directly with what you have said, I have not seen the exegesis if there is any; and the exegesis that I’ve seen generally puts the Abrahamic narrative into the broader context of Genesis 1-11, which does not serve the disp position. Further, and my memory is a few years removed from having read them, but disp literature for the general public seems to simply assume rather than exegete. I’m sure you can easily produce something that would refute this, and I would be happy to read it.

Regarding the assumption of the normalcy of language: I would only ask one question at this point. Of what historical setting is “normal” and “plain” determined by? I believe this to be an utterly crucial question.

[Larry]

The gross imprecision of the meaning of “literal” hermeneutic. Closer inspection tends to reveal that “literal” means what the system reads back into the term. Closer inspection reveals that “literal” is not really literal in the sense of being opposed to the non-literal, for literal somehow encompasses the metaphorical non-literal elements of speech. My discussions with dispensationalists have tended to be “goal post moving” sessions where I’m trying to pin down the meaning, while the other keeps shifting the categories. What is literal?

There are no doubt some who use it imprecisely (on both sides). But I would not build your case on the worst of dispensationalism, anymore than I should build my case on the worst of one of the alternatives.

Then I will go after what appears to be the best of dispensationalism, where “literal” appears to mean “grammatical/historical” context. Does the meaning of “literal” here allow for an author’s intended use of metaphor? The question about metaphor becomes extremely relevant when dealing with Brent Sandy’s book “Plowshares & Pruning Hooks” where he establishes the norm of prophetic genre to be highly metaphorical, secondarily about the future, with a primary focus upon persuasion (preaching at his contemporaries). The question also pits the disp definition of literal “in theory” against the disp “practice” when encountering an actual situation. Second question: does the meaning of “literal” here allow for the literary theological method? This has to do with dispensationalism’s acceptance of an authorially intended use of history to convey a primarily theological message. What this means is that modern “scientific” assumptions have to be pushed to the side (not excluded altogether), for history is used as a vehicle to convey a theological message.

[Larry]

“literal” is an undefined meaningless term

It’s not really undefined. Here are three definitions:

“This recognition of a metaphorical style is not to be thought of as a return to allegorization, nor is it a “spiritualizing” of the passage. When a writer employs metaphor he is to be understood metaphorically and his metaphorical meaning is his literal meaning: that is to say, it is the truth he wishes to convey. The term “literal” stands strictly as the opposite of “figurative,” but in modern speech it often means “real,” and it is used this way by those who want to be sure that they know what the writer really and originally meant. In this sense a metaphorical saying is “literally” true. … Thus a metaphorical statement is “literally” true but cannot be “literalistically” true. The “literal” meaning, then, is what the particular writer intended, and although he used metaphor, no one familiar with the language in which he expressed himself could reasonably misunderstand him” (Kevan, “The Principle of Interpretation,” in Revelation and the Bible, ed Henry, p. 294).

“Dispensationalists claim that their principle of hermeneutics is that of literal interpretation. This means interpretation that gives to every word the same meaning it would have in normal usage, whether employed in writing, speaking, or thinking. It is sometimes called grammatical-historical interpretation since the meaning of each word is determined by grammatical and historical considerations. The principle might also be called normal interpretation since the literal meaning of the words is the normal approach to their understanding in all languages. … Symbols, figures of speech, and types are all interpreted plainly in this method, and they are in no way contrary to literal interpretation. After all, the very existence of any meaning for a figure of speech depends on the reality of the literal meaning of the terms involved” (Ryrie, Dispensationalism, p. 80).

“The literalist (so called) is not one who denies that figurative language, that symbols, are used in prophecy, nor does he deny that great spiritual truths are set forth therein; his position is, simply, that the prophecies are to be normally interpreted (i.e., according to the received laws of language) as any other utterances are interpretation—that which is manifestly figurative being so regarded” (Lange, Revelation, cited in Ryrie, p. 81).

I don’t doubt that dispensationalists include the non-literal in their definitions of “literal”, and I never assumed anything other to be the case. My problem tends to focus upon (1) the use of the confusing language just to keep clinging to the term “literal” and (2) to the tendency to be oblivious as to how one’s theology often determines what one sees as “literal”. Again, no one dealt with my Open Theism example on this point. It is almost as if the disp sees literal as if the data in Scripture is “brute fact”, which is an impossible position.

As the first definition above really seems to emphasize, “literal” is really meant as the opposite of “allegorization” and “spiritualization”. When dealing with the issue of metaphor, I really think that Sandy is much more clear than the first definition. You don’t take the “surface meaning” as the meaning {Sandy, D Brent, Plowshares & Pruning Hoods, (IVP Academic: Downers Grove, 2002), p. 39}. In other words, you don’t take metaphor literally. Much like our expressions of “freeze,” ect. You don’t take it literally. The opening definition has to add another term to “literal” in order to clarify this issue. Now we have “literalistically” added into the mix because you really can’t take figurative language literally. But because we have to protect the label of “literal” we have to add “literalistically” instead of saying that we don’t read the surface meaning literally. The reader has to note that “the specific words of the text are pointing to a meaning beyond the surface meanings of the words. (p.39)” Sandy goes on in the same page and the next to point out that there are degrees of being removed from the literal meaning/surface meaning; hence, “literalness” is not a black or white issue. What is taken from the word “freeze” is the idea of rigidity or immobility; a person is to cease from activity in a manner like unto a froze state. This is the meaning. The first definition above would apparently call this the “literal” meaning, with the “literalistic” meaning being that of a person thinking that he would have to “literally” become frozen. The key also becomes understanding the language, which requires a historical context, which may be remarkably different than how a person in modern culture would “normally” or “plainly” read it; so the definition itself can be at odds with other labels like “plain” and “normal”. So my problem with the first definition has more to do with its wording than with its content; its wording lends itself to the creation of confusion and a lack of clarity. My problem with the second definition is that “normal” must be understood under the umbrella of “historical context”; it is not as though the modern reader reads it normally, with his modern scientific assumptions and historiography intact. So while the second addresses the grammatical/historical, it unfortunately does not connect “normal” with the previous. Also, when it says that symbols, figures of speech, and types are interpreted plainly, I am forced to ask once again; what era defines “plainness”? Is not the modern reader at a disadvantage in recognizing past figures of speech? Perhaps this question is completely lost to those who are monolingual; in fact, the question is probably lost. When the Hebrew speaks of a person being “long nosed”, does the modern reader read that normally? Again, this is one example of many. Here is another example. Do we read “bulls of Bashan” normally? Do you see how this language (the disp definition) is horribly confusing? The first example was of an idiom, and both are examples of how the reader cannot simply read the surface level meaning of the text. One has to go beyond the surface level meaning. The third definition above is simply too vague. The reader is left wondering, “What are these laws of language?” And “what is this normal interpretation?” Heaping undefined terms together doesn’t help the definition. So to terms used to define literal are too elastic, and thus “literal” can mean way too much or too little.

[Larry] So I don’t think anyone who knows what they are talking about argues that literal is the opposite of figurative or or metaphorical. Literal encompasses figurative and metaphorical. Literal is normal. The opposite would something like spiritual or allegorical.

I think the mistake made by the opponents of dispensationalism is focusing on the meaning of “literal,” and thus saying something that dispensationalism doesn’t say. The real issue is not “literal” vs. “figurative” but the “consistent use” of literal or normal hermeneutic. The problem with the alternatives to dispensationalism is that they are inconsistent in their use of a normal hermeneutic when it comes to the Scripture. So going after dispensationalism based on “literal” is the wrong tack, IMO, first because the opponents use the exact same hermeneutic, and second, because they don’t use it consistently.

Regarding people who know what they are talking about: I hope this is in reference to people who know what they are talking about with respect to the self-understanding of disp. Otherwise, I disagree that those who know what they are talking about (broadly stated outside the bounds of disp). One such individual is Brent Sandy (p.40). I’ll quote him, and “yes” his book is one of the best treatments on the whole issue of “metaphor” that I’ve ever seen (not saying too much, as I’m not a huge literary person). Here is the quote. “For the purposes of this book, it is not a matter of literal opposite the historical sense but literal opposite the figurative sense and the degrees away from the surface meaning.” Here, one individual, who knows what he is talking about (he is a linguist) argues that literal is the opposite of figurative or metaphorical.

In continuing on with your own comments in your first paragraph, you continue by defining “literal” in dispensational terms rather than how it is commonly understood to be literally used. Your understanding is that it is opposite to spiritual/allegorical. Again, this is a definition based out of a reaction against certain hermeneutical abuses of the past and covenant theology in particular. It is not the “normal” understanding of literal.

Contrary to what you state, I think that it is very important to focus upon what “literal” means to the dispensationalist, for therein is found their system tied up with their terms in a way that is not normal or literal (since literal now encompasses the non-literal). The facade of approaching the text as “brute fact” or in terms of common sense realism appears to be near the root of it. This leads to a remarkably inability to observe personal assumptions, theological assumptions, and world view (subjective elements) that are often brought into the interpretive process.

In regard to consistency: I may be inclined to agree with you if you were pointing to how one uses an “allegorical” use here and a “literal” approach there. However, I’m hitting at a different level. It is the dispensationalist that has defined himself into ALWAYS being literal even when he is not, so now he is “consistent”! Oh the irony! Also, the only options available are not “literal” vs “spiritual/allegorical”. There are many more issues and options even within the category of “literal” as my questions above have indicated. This means that “consistency” is relative. Certainly, according to the self-definition of dis, others are not consistent. But who is really going to let dispensationalists define/determine what is consistent? In other words, the “consistency” jab only begs the question of dispensationalism. In other words, such a statement is only preaching to the choir, to borrow a non-literal metaphor.

I hope that this explains things a little bit better, and I hope that it points out more clearly why I write these things in opposition to disp.