A Review of Harrison Perkins’ “Reformed Covenant Theology” (Part 1)

A Review of Harrison Perkins, Reformed Covenant Theology: A Systematic Introduction, Bellingham, WA., Lexham, 2024, 520 pages, hardback.

There is no shortage of books on Covenant Theology (CT). There is the big multi author compendium simply called Covenant Theology edited by Waters, Reid, and Muether. One of the contributors to that book is Richard Belcher, whose The Fulfillment of the Promises of God, which to my mind is the best introduction to CT on the market. Other introductions by Jonty Rhodes, Stephen Myers, R. C. Sproul, Keele & Brown, and Patrick Abendroth all help the reader to comprehend CT. Then of course there are the standard works by Palmer Robertson and older writes like Herman Witsius, Robert Rollock, and Francis Roberts. There’s also the extremely useful book by Pascal Denault, The Distinctiveness of Baptist Covenant Theology.

What then, is the contribution of Harrison Perkins’ Reformed Covenant Theology? The answer is that Perkins both introduces CT while also wrapping it around a treatment of Systematic Theology. And even though I don’t come within a hundred miles of Perkins in my understanding of God’s covenants, I am mightily impressed with his ability to present CT so persuasively. Naturally, I was not persuaded, but the author deserves a lot of credit.

My reasons of remaining unpersuaded will come in due time. First I need to run through Perkins’ presentation. The first thing one must pay attention to is the author’s definition of covenant. Perkins answer is that “A covenant is most simply a formal relationship.” (5). They “are not exactly contracts” but “embody relationships where people become bound to one another in some fixed way” (ibid, emphasis his). He adds the mystifying note that covenants “are flexible,…capable of relational dynamics, but also fundamentally legal and binding” (ibid). He doesn’t explain why they are flexible, or in what way. I would reply by saying that one thing covenants are not is flexible! Furthermore, God’s covenants, although most definitely binding, are not legal since God cannot be called to book by a standard outside Himself.

The author will go on to state “God’s promise is unchangeable because he makes his promises within covenants that obligate him—of course by his own choice—to be faithful to those promises” (8). Of course, it all depends on which covenants CT’s believe God is obligated to keep! But one thing missing from his discussion is what Paul Williamson (Sealed with an Oath) calls the sine qua non of covenants—the central oath. I certainly agree that “covenants are a source of clarity and assurance about how you relate to God” (9).

The author launches us into the foundational Law—Gospel distinction of the Reformation (10-15) and the principles of works and grace. This is the starting point for the formulation of what became CT, and it explains in large part the deductive nature of the whole enterprise (cf. 12). If the goal is to understand Scripture in terms of works and grace then already ones focus is narrowly confined to salvation through the Christian Gospel and its outworking in sanctification. And indeed, one of the things that is lacking in this book (and in many CT works) is a clear explanation of the warrant for reading the Bible via the theological covenants of redemption, works, and grace. For example, just reading pages 14 and 15 of the book shows that these theological covenants are simply dropped in as if they have a right to be there.

The Covenant of Works

And so we come to the so-called “covenant of works.” Perkins states that this covenant is “based on that covenantal principle of law and works rather than grace and promise.” (19). One can see that the Law–Gospel paradigm will ground the discussion. The lead-off proof-text is, naturally, Hosea 6:7 (“But like Adam they have transgressed my covenant”). That, at least, is the rendering favored by the NASB and ESV. The KJV and NKJV have “like men” while the NIV has “at Adam.” The translation is disputed, with the majority of commentators opting for the “at Adam” interpretation. The problem with the “like Adam” view is that it is question-begging, since there is no other text of Scripture to support an Adamic covenant. Both Williamson (Sealed with an Oath, 55-56) and Block (Covenant, 46) reject the “like Adam” interpretation, and even if that position is adopted it is still possible that Hosea is likening the people of his day and their attitude to the Mosaic covenant with Adam’s willful attitude at the tree and not with an assumed covenant in Genesis 3 for which no Pentateuchal record exists. Perkins lists a number of scholars who prefer “like Adam” but it needs saying that several CT’s themselves question that rendering, including John Murray. The Illustrated Bible Backgrounds Commentary edited by John H. Walton says,

Rather than being a reference to the first man, here “Adam” is best understood as a place. This provides a better match for the word “there” later in the verse and also with “Gilead” in the next verse. (J. Glen Taylor, “Hosea,” 28)

Suffice it to say, the covenants of works is on rocky terrain exegetically.

Since the Law–Grace dichotomy is so foundational to CT it is unsurprising to discover that they insist Adam was under the Law. Perkins spends about 50 pages on this! Admittedly, he didn’t have the written Ten Commandments, but he supposedly had them “hardwired into him” (29, 32, 35-36), and enshrined in the covenant of works. Now, it is true that nine of the Ten Commandments have a universal character (cf. 40), but that is not the same thing as saying that Adam was bound to a covenant of law. Romans 4:15 says that “where there is no law there is no transgression.” Paul’s whole point there is that Abraham was not under law when he was circumcised. How then could Adam be under law?

CT’s point out that Adam did transgress according to Romans 5:14, but that was not a transgression of law but of God’s specific prohibition. As for the Sabbath day, well, CT’s construct an argument based off of Exodus 20:11, but they turn it into a command instead of an ordinance. Perkins cites Exodus 16:22ff to try to prove “that God’s people were responsible to honor the Sabbath well before God delivered that commend atop Mount Sinai” (39). But Exodus 16 was the first time they knew about it, and it was called “a Sabbath” not “the Sabbath.” One has to keep an eye out for such things, otherwise one is liable to be swept away with a faulty argument.

From this premise it is a natural move to designate the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil as another law (41), this time a symbol of the covenant of works (42)! Then it is asserted that after a probationary period Adam would have passed the test and been granted eternal life (43-44, 57); the Tree of Life in this scenario functioned as a reward for obedience to the covenant (81-82), which Adam did not have the right to until he passed the test (82). The fact that this inference is directly contradicted by Genesis 2:16-17 merely demonstrates how an idea can prosper in spite of its being exegetically questionable.