Presuppositional Apologetics (Part 1)

Image

Michael Otazu

The conversations I have with my curious three-year-old son and the conversations I have with ardent atheists are strikingly similar. Both involve repetitive questions about why things are the way they are. Both involve inquiries into why I believe what I believe. And both eventually reduce me to the foundational answer, “Because God said so.” Whether we are explaining why the sky is blue to ever-curious children or defending the core tenets of our faith against philosophical combatants, the presuppositions we hold are the bedrock of our apologetic. This article will make the case that it is our presuppositions that should anchor and guide our apologetic strategy. Additionally, some related practical encouragements for daily practice will be offered for consideration.

Biblical Epistemology

No discussion of presuppositionalism is possible without at least a brief consideration of biblical epistemology. The fundamental question of epistemology asks how we know that which we know or from what source we obtain an understanding of that which is. In other words, into what substance do we stake the flags of our knowledge claims?

According to some, like John Locke and David Hume, the answer lies in empiricism. They would argue that all knowledge is derived from sensory input and scientific processing. To empiricists, knowledge comes from the raw data available in the universe. It must only be observed and scientifically analyzed. Proponents of rationalism, such as Rene Descartes and Baruch Spinoza, deemphasize the value of raw empiricism and argue that knowledge is produced by pure reason. Whereas empiricists usually hold to tabula rasa (the idea that man is a blank slate from birth), rationalists understand that man has some level of innate knowledge and ability to reason and that he must employ such faculties in his production of knowledge. Constructivists, like Jean Piaget, argue that knowledge is built independently by individuals, and they emphasize such factors as personal experience, cognitive frameworks, and social influence.

Though these theories are diverse, they share a commonality in that they fail to adequately account for the biblical teaching on the subject. Some argue that the Bible has nothing to offer to the field of epistemology. It has been said that “the very idea of a biblical epistemology seems…as misguided as the idea of a biblical meteorology.”1 On the contrary, God has spoken clearly and definitively on the subject. Throughout Scripture, God has revealed that the foundational element in the acquisition of knowledge is belief.

Unbelief: The Barrier to Understanding

Without a mind that has been renewed by conversion, true knowledge is unattainable. In Ecclesiastes 1:12-18, King Solomon, the wisest man to ever walk the earth save Jesus, recounted the end to which mere worldly knowledge can take a man. More than anyone else in history, Solomon had a chance to leverage human wisdom and knowledge to acquire for himself ultimate satisfaction. He was the wisest, richest, most powerful man in the world, yet he concluded that mere knowledge derived apart from the salvific fear of God is nothing but “vexation” and “pain” (Ecc 1:18). The natural state of the human mind is lost (Eph 2:1-3). Without salvation from slavery to sin, a person cannot be liberated to think rightly.

Belief: The Prerequisite to Presuppositional Apologetics

It is only when one is converted that he will personally possess true knowledge and understanding. Only when a soul is regenerated can a mind hold the presuppositions necessary for true biblical apologetics. Apart from the fear of God, categorically accurate knowledge is impossible. Stated positively, “The fear of Yahweh is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding” (Pr 9:10, LSB; see also Pr 1:7; 15:33; Ps 111:10; Job 28:28). Once belief has dominated and realigned the whole of one’s perspective, the content of presuppositionalism should be considered.

The Content of Presuppositionalism

A genuine and robust fear of God is not only the prerequisite to biblical apologetics; it is also the primary foundation of biblical apologetics. All presuppositions necessary for biblical apologetics flow from the fear of God. For if one has been given the life-altering, mind-renewing gift of belief, he will necessarily hold to those core tenets of the faith, namely that God exists, and that His Word is truth. These two foundational presuppositions bear the load of the structure of apologetics. Anyone who hopes to make a defense of the hope that is within them (1Pe 3:15) must wholeheartedly presuppose the facts of God’s existence and truthfulness. If we waver on these points, our defense will fall apart eventually. If we fail to totally commit ourselves to God as the Author of truth, we will fail to defend the Christian faith; in fact, we will be shown to have no faith at all. It is the presuppositions to which we most fundamentally cling that keep our defense steady in the face of fierce opposition.

The Delusion of Neutrality

The main thrust of opposition to presuppositionalism is wrapped up in the misguided idea that the only viable starting point for apologetics must be neutral. Non-presuppositionalists would claim that to make a defense for Christianity, the defender must meet the inquirer on shared ground; they must begin without presuppositions. This insistence on neutrality, however, reveals a basic flaw. Presuppositions are unavoidable. Total neutrality is impossible.

Here, again, epistemology proves vital to apologetics. Empiricists claim that their starting point is neutral. They argue that if we just start from nothing and simply collect raw data from the world around us and run it through the scientific method, pure truth will result. The problem with this theory is that it presupposes that observation and the testing process of science are authoritative and infallible. This is far from neutral.

Rationalists similarly think that they are starting from neutral in that they take all truth claims and run them through the filter of human rationality and that if it stands the test of reason, then it must be true. The flaw here is similar to that of empiricism, it presupposes that human reason is infallible. It elevates reason above God and thus is not neutral.

Presuppositions are inevitable. Sterile starting points are impossible. To insist on arguing under the banner of pure neutrality is delusional. Our inquiry ought not to be whether we have presuppositions. Rather, the thrust of our apologetic preparation must be centered on which presuppositions we hold.

Notes

1 Kelley James Clark, Five Views on Apologetics. Stanley N. Gundry and Steven B. Cowan, eds. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 256.


Michael is an Associate Pastor at Indian Hills Community Church in Lincoln, NE as well as a Master of Divinity student at The Master’s Seminary.

Discussion

Without a mind that has been renewed by conversion, true knowledge is unattainable.

I am not sure this is how PA puts it and I don’t think it is accurate. An unbeliever can have true knowledge but he cannot justify that knowledge. I think Van Til/Bahnsen talked about “justified true belief.” An unbeliever can truly know things but he cannot justify that knowledge from his vantage point.

I haven’t dove into PA since seminary, and I don’t recall anything on that specific point. I wonder, though, if the key word from this article’s author’s perspective is “true” in “true knowledge.” As in, something like complete and grounded?

It’s certainly a widespread take on “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” and “in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” PA or not.

Personally, I lean toward a more expansive view of common grace, so I would sooner say, “An unbeliever can have true knowledge but he cannot justify that knowledge.” Well, you can justify it superficially, but it doesn’t ultimately cohere, as far as worldview is concerned.

I’m pretty sure PA would agree that true knowledge of the gospel is not attainable “without a mind that has been renewed by” at least regeneration?

Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.

There's a lot of confusion around Van Til and "knowledge" because he uses the term in two senses: (1) knowledge as a metaphysical inevitability; (2) knowledge as justified true belief.

The Romans 1 sense of "knowledge" is that it is a metaphysical inevitability.

  1. What can be known about God is plain; God has shown it (1:19).
  2. They (everyone) knew God (1:21).
  3. They exchanged the truth for a lie (implying that they had the truth) (1:25).
  4. They are held accountable based on what they know of God's righteous decree (1:32).
  5. The "knowledge" is akin to "knowledge by acquaintance" (Bertrand Russell): the knowledge isn't necessarily verbal and discursive in their head, and yet God is ever present to them through his creation, so that they cannot fail to "know" God in the same way that I cannot fail to "know" if you are present in the room with me (1:20).

Since unbelievers refuse to acknowledge / believe this, it sets up a paradoxical situation. Traditionally, we think of "knowledge" as justified, true belief, where belief is a "component" of knowledge. But paradoxically, unbelievers to not believe what they do know.

Because they do not believe it, everything they produce in terms of discursive knowledge lacks justification within their own epistemological system, even when they are formally correct with what they say about the universe in general. So they do not have knowledge in sense (2), justified, true belief.

This leads to the fact that the "transcendental argument for God" is the "big guns" within presuppositionalism; anything the unbeliever does to try to disprove God requires epistemological components that require belief in God to justify them.

I don't recommend pulling out that argument until it's required. I think we can have ordinary conversations with ordinary people, and discuss the evidence, and our reasons for believing, and still speak in a presuppositionalist way, without leaning hard on the transcendantal argument from the get-go.

Michael Osborne
Philadelphia, PA

That’s helpful.

This resonated with me

anything the unbeliever does to try to disprove God requires epistemological components that require belief in God to justify them.

I don’t recommend pulling out that argument until it’s required. I think we can have ordinary conversations with ordinary people, and discuss the evidence, and our reasons for believing, and still speak in a presuppositionalist way, without leaning hard on the transcendantal argument from the get-go.

I’m reading a bit of Stephen Meyer right now. I doubt he is for PA, but he has noted the transcendental argument (though not by name) with with some enthusiasm… and talks about presuppositions in science.

So… I don’t mean to say the differences among the schools of apologetics don’t matter, but in conversations with “ordinary people,” there is quite a lot of overlap in how evangelistic/pre-evangelistic/apologetic conversations happen. So it seems to me.

Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.